{"id":2915,"date":"2026-10-30T09:22:20","date_gmt":"2026-10-30T09:22:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/?p=2915"},"modified":"2026-11-12T09:30:51","modified_gmt":"2026-11-12T09:30:51","slug":"iraq-amid-the-prospect-of-renewed-war-against-iran","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/iraq-amid-the-prospect-of-renewed-war-against-iran\/","title":{"rendered":"Iraq Amid the Prospect of Renewed War Against Iran"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Executive Summary<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Iraq is entering a sensitive period amid indications that military operations against Iran could resume, following a regional confrontation whose subsequent de-escalation did not develop into a durable settlement. The prospect of renewed escalation is exceptionally consequential for Baghdad, not only because of Iraq\u2019s geographic proximity and its political and economic ties with Tehran, but also because it coincides with domestic vulnerabilities: multiple centres of security decision-making, the difficulty of bringing arms under exclusive state control, and fiscal and monetary pressures linked to oil and the dollar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The situation is made more sensitive by announced understandings under which armed groups would cease operations for ninety days as a preliminary step toward relinquishing their weapons. These arrangements coincide with the repercussions of attacks on Gulf facilities that, according to official statements and published reports, originated from Iraqi territory. This paper advances the proposition that the principal risk is not necessarily the direct extension of the war into Iraq, but the transmission of its effects across the security, economic and foreign-policy spheres, producing a compound crisis that conventional policy instruments may struggle to contain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The paper examines indicators of escalation and the limits of a negotiated settlement. It assesses Iraq\u2019s exposure in the areas of security, the effort to bring arms under state control, the Islamic State, public-sector salaries, the dollar, border management and relations with Arab states. It then presents three scenarios for the following six months. These scenarios are not deterministic predictions, but conditional pathways linked to observable indicators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>First: Indicators of Renewed War Against Iran and the Limits of a Settlement<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The possibility of renewed war cannot be understood separately from the issues that remain politically unresolved: Iran\u2019s nuclear programme, sanctions, freedom of navigation and the future of Iranian military capabilities. A military pause does not necessarily resolve the drivers of conflict; it may instead become a period in which capabilities and positions are reorganized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Three principal indicators stand out: continuing military preparations and operational options; stalled negotiations over guarantees and the sequencing of concessions; and the vulnerability of navigation and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, escalation is constrained by the high cost of war to regional and international economies, the possibility that attacks could expand to energy facilities and ports, and the continuation of mediation efforts. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between indicators of military preparedness and the inevitability of war, and among a limited strike, a sustained campaign of attrition and a comprehensive regional confrontation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The consequences for Iraq would depend on the form and duration of the war and the nature of the responses it generates. A short operation might produce financial and security disruption that remains containable, whereas a prolonged closure of maritime routes or an expansion of cross-border attacks would create pressure extending well beyond the initial shock. For this reason, the paper focuses on the mechanisms through which risk would be transmitted rather than attempting to predict a specific date for the outbreak of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Second: The Security Dilemma and Arrangements to Bring Arms Under State Control<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Security is the most direct channel through which escalation could affect Iraq. The central difficulty lies in the gap between the legal status of the Popular Mobilization Forces within the state security system and the fact that some armed groups do not submit their operational decisions to the government. Some groups may choose not to participate in a renewed confrontation in order to protect their political and economic interests, while others may regard an attack on Iran as justification for resuming military operations. This divergence requires a careful assessment of the government\u2019s efforts to bring these groups under state authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The government announced a roadmap based on a ninety-day cessation of armed operations, followed by the gradual surrender of heavy weapons and the concentration of military decision-making in the hands of the state. The end of June 2027 was presented as the target date for completing this process.[1]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If war resumes, these understandings could face an immediate test. Strikes on positions belonging to Iraqi armed groups may revive arguments for retaining weapons. Reports have also indicated that Iraqi authorities suspect Israel of targeting Chinese-made air-defence systems held by armed groups and supplied through Iran, a possible indication that future attacks could extend to the groups\u2019 more advanced defensive capabilities.[2]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Conversely, attacks launched from Iraqi territory against U.S. or Gulf interests would intensify external pressure on Baghdad to accelerate disarmament. Between these two pressures, the government faces the challenge of protecting sovereignty without being drawn into a war in which its own institutions have not decided to participate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The paradox is that the Popular Mobilization Forces form part of the state\u2019s official security architecture, while the underlying problem concerns the autonomous military decision-making of certain formations rather than their institutional identity alone. The transfer of equipment or administrative integration is therefore insufficient if the decision to use force remains outside the official chain of command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The durability of the ninety-day arrangement will become an early indicator of the state\u2019s ability to monopolize decisions of war and peace. Its collapse could postpone the effort to bring arms under state control, reopen tensions between the government and some armed groups, and increase the risk of external strikes inside Iraq. This does not require assuming a general collapse; the relevant indicators are divergences in the groups\u2019 positions and the degree to which commitments are implemented in practice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The arrangement\u2019s real significance lies in the political bargain underpinning it. The government seeks to avoid direct confrontation with groups that possess military, political and economic influence, while some of those groups seek to preserve their interests and power as new arrangements take shape. Acceptance of a pause does not necessarily amount to acceptance of relinquishing autonomous operational authority. A distinction must therefore be drawn among surrendering heavy weapons, ending independent command structures, and dismantling networks of finance and influence. The state may succeed at the first level without completing the others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">War could encourage some groups to integrate institutionally in order to protect their gains, while leading others to retain their weapons as a guarantee of survival. The more complex scenario would involve formal administrative integration alongside the continuation of informal channels of command. In that case, bringing arms under state control would succeed in legal form without producing an effective state monopoly over decisions of war and peace.[3]\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Third: The Risk of Islamic State Exploiting Security Distraction<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regional escalation raises questions about the ability of Iraq\u2019s security services to sustain counter-Islamic State operations, particularly if protecting borders and critical infrastructure requires units to be redeployed or intelligence resources diverted. Renewed war should not be assumed to produce an automatic return by the organization to territorial control; its present capabilities and the nature of the threat differ from earlier phases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Monitoring by the Iraq Center for Future Studies indicates that the Islamic State\u2019s declared activity in Iraq has declined. The Centre recorded sixteen operations claimed by the organization in 2025, compared with eleven operations between the beginning of 2026 and 14 October of that year. This points to continued activity at a low level, without sufficient evidence that the organization has restored its former operational capabilities.[4]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The more realistic danger is that the organization could exploit limited gaps in difficult terrain or at seams between areas of security responsibility, conducting low-cost attacks or targeting roads and checkpoints. These risks would increase if coordination among security agencies deteriorated or if the security leadership became preoccupied with attacks on armed-group positions, military bases or critical infrastructure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The appropriate response is to insulate counterterrorism from regional polarization and preserve intelligence collection and pre-emptive operations. In this sense, the state\u2019s success should not be measured solely by its ability to prevent major attacks, but by its capacity to keep an external crisis from altering domestic security priorities in ways that create exploitable gaps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Fourth: The Economy Between Oil, the Dollar and the Salary Crisis<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Iraq relies on oil revenues to finance most of its budget, on imports to meet a large share of domestic demand, and on the dollar to settle external transactions. Disruption to shipping, exports or financial transfers can therefore move rapidly from global markets into public finances and then into domestic markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analysis by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy highlights the vulnerability of Iraq\u2019s energy sector to disruption in exports, imported gas, and transport and insurance costs. It also notes that higher oil prices do not necessarily produce higher revenues when export volumes decline or ports are disrupted. This distinction is essential to understanding the difference between war\u2019s effect on global oil prices and its actual effect on the Iraqi treasury.[5]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The vulnerability of public-sector salaries arises from the scale of recurrent obligations and the difficulty of adjusting them quickly. A decline in revenue would not automatically halt salary payments, but it could prompt the government to postpone investment spending, increase borrowing or reorder its priorities. An International Monetary Fund report has warned of the risks created by oil dependence and high current expenditure, which make a prolonged shock more costly.[6]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The dollar represents a parallel transmission channel. A decline in foreign-currency inflows, combined with higher import and transfer costs, can intensify pressure on the exchange market and the prices of imported goods. The severity of the effect would depend on inventories, market competition, central-bank policy, and the commercial sector\u2019s ability to obtain dollars through official channels.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A clear causal chain can be identified: disrupted exports reduce revenue and dollar inflows; declining resources place pressure on expenditure and liquidity; import disruption increases the cost of goods; and these pressures then affect purchasing power and economic confidence. This chain should not be reduced to the exchange rate alone, because the initial disruption may arise from export volumes and access to international markets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The World Bank has also emphasized the regional economy\u2019s sensitivity to war and energy shocks. Iraq\u2019s economic trajectory would therefore depend not only on oil prices, but on the duration of disruption to supply routes and the country\u2019s capacity to diversify its commercial outlets.[7]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Assessing the effect of war on Iraq requires more than observing the price of a barrel of oil. A distinction must be made among the oil price, the volume exported, the revenue actually realized, and the timing with which liquidity reaches the treasury. The global price may rise while Iraqi revenue falls if ports are disrupted or transport and insurance costs increase. The core problem then becomes the gap between possessing oil wealth and converting it into available fiscal revenue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The crisis would unfold across three layers: a revenue crisis caused by a decline in the volume of oil actually exported; a liquidity crisis caused by an inability to provide funds when obligations fall due; and an expenditure crisis in which fixed recurrent commitments narrow the government\u2019s ability to finance services and investment. Borrowing may temporarily address a liquidity shortfall, but it cannot compensate for lower exports or resolve the structural imbalance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nor does an increase in the quantity of Iraqi dinars generated by selling dollars at a higher official exchange rate create genuinely new economic resources. It redistributes the burden between the budget and consumers. When import prices rise without a corresponding increase in incomes, the cost of managing fiscal pressure is transferred to household purchasing power. Maintaining the liquidity required to pay salaries must therefore be distinguished from preserving the real value of those salaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Fifth: The Border with Iran and the Challenges of Interdependence<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Iraqi-Iranian border contains commercial crossings and routes for the movement of people, as well as dense religious and economic ties that affect markets in border provinces. Escalation could lead to tighter procedures at crossings, disruption to transport and production inside Iran, or difficulties in financial settlement, with consequences for traded goods and services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Energy constitutes an additional vulnerability. Part of Iraq\u2019s electricity generation depends on imported Iranian gas. The Washington Institute has noted persistent problems with gas supplies and payment arrangements, as well as delays in projects intended to diversify sources of supply. These factors leave the electricity sector particularly sensitive to any additional disruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Security challenges may also arise in protecting border crossings, preventing border areas from being used for cross-border operations, and responding to possible displacement and smuggling. Iraq must distinguish between preserving economic and humanitarian ties with Iran and preventing its territory from becoming an extension of the theatre of operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Sixth: Attacks on the Gulf and the Limits of Iraqi Neutrality<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Attacks launched from Iraqi territory against the interests of neighbouring states have become a practical issue rather than a merely hypothetical one. Reports addressed a drone attack on Saudi Arabia\u2019s East-West oil pipeline in September 2026 and cited confirmation that the attack originated in Iraq. Attribution to a particular organization, however, remained subject to competing accounts and investigations and should not be conflated with evidence that the attack itself occurred.[8]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Press reports also quoted the Iraqi foreign minister discussing the investigation, contacts with Saudi Arabia, and efforts to prevent armed groups from making independent decisions to attack other countries. This demonstrates how a single attack can produce consequences extending beyond the security sphere to diplomatic relations, economic cooperation and mutual confidence.[9]\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If war against Iran resumes, some Iraqi armed groups may choose to target Gulf facilities or U.S. interests in the region. Iraq could then face military retaliation or political pressure even if the government were not a direct party to the operation. A declaration of neutrality would be insufficient unless accompanied by an effective capacity to prevent Iraqi territory and airspace from being used to conduct offensive operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Any external response against sites inside Iraq could, in turn, place domestic pressure on the government to defend sovereignty and complicate its de-escalation arrangements with armed groups. Iraq\u2019s Gulf relationships are therefore directly connected to the effort to bring arms under state control; the two cannot be treated as separate policy tracks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">An escalation chain could begin with an attack launched from Iraqi territory, followed by an external strike on an Iraqi site, and then by domestic pressure on the government to respond to a violation of sovereignty. The state would find itself required to defend its territory from the consequences of an operation it did not authorize. This is the point at which multiple centres of military decision-making cease to be merely an internal organizational problem and become a constraint on foreign policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The issue is especially sensitive because attacks on Gulf energy facilities could also affect Iraq by disrupting routes that offer alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz and by increasing insurance and trade costs. Controlling cross-border operations is therefore not a diplomatic concession, but a condition for protecting Iraq\u2019s own economic and security interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Seventh: Scenarios for the Next Six Months<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Scenario One: Continued pressure and mutual containment.<\/strong> Military threats, sanctions and maritime restrictions persist alongside inconclusive negotiations, without a new large-scale military campaign. Economic and security pressure would continue, but the de-escalation and gradual weapons-surrender arrangements would retain a chance of survival. Indicators include the continuation of mediation and the absence of major strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Scenario Two: Limited strikes and calibrated responses.<\/strong> Operations against selected targets inside Iran resume, followed by responses whose scope the parties attempt to contain. The ninety-day arrangement could be shaken, while the likelihood of limited attacks on external interests and pressure on trade and the dollar market would increase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Scenario Three: A widening regional confrontation.<\/strong> Operations extend to energy facilities, ports, bases and maritime routes. Iraq would then face disruption to exports and public revenue, pressure along its borders, setbacks to the effort to bring arms under state control, and growing tension with Gulf states. The principal danger lies in the simultaneity and interaction of these crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The severity of the effect on Iraq would not depend solely on the scale of the war. A limited strike could generate a major Iraqi crisis if accompanied by divisions among armed groups or attacks on Gulf facilities launched from Iraqi territory. Conversely, some effects of a wider war might remain manageable if Iraq preserved unified security decision-making and maintained adequate financial resources and alternative supply routes. The two decisive variables are therefore the scope of external escalation and the resilience of Iraq\u2019s domestic arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Eighth: Options for Iraq\u2019s Position<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>In the security sphere<\/strong>, the government needs unified operational decision-making, protection of critical infrastructure, and continuity in counterterrorism operations, alongside gradual and verifiable implementation of the effort to bring arms under state control. This requires a clear distinction between the formal integration of armed formations and the subordination of decisions to use force to the official chain of command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>In the economic sphere<\/strong>, Iraq needs a fiscal contingency plan that identifies spending priorities, preserves essential obligations, and expands alternatives for oil exports and the supply of energy and strategic goods. Coordination between fiscal and monetary policy will also be necessary to mitigate disruption in the dollar market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>In the diplomatic sphere<\/strong>, Iraq should maintain communication with Washington, Tehran and Arab capitals, reject the use of Iraqi territory for attacks against neighbouring states, and oppose any violation of Iraqi sovereignty. A declared position will not be sufficient unless it is supported by enforceable security and institutional measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The prospect of renewed war against Iran presents the Iraqi state with a compound test. War would not create all of Iraq\u2019s domestic vulnerabilities from the outset, but it could accelerate their consequences and reduce the time and resources available to address them. The arrangements to bring arms under state control, the regularity of oil revenues, and the capacity to prevent attacks on neighbouring states are practical indicators of Baghdad\u2019s ability to contain the repercussions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The central conclusion of this assessment is that the danger lies not only in regional war itself, but in the transmission of its effects across the institutions and sectors of the Iraqi state, transforming separate pressures into a compound crisis. The success of Iraq\u2019s position will therefore be measured not merely by a declaration of neutrality, but by its ability to preserve the independence of security decision-making, sustain financial resources, and maintain stable regional relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Notes and References<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[1] Enabling Peace in Iraq Center. (2026, October 1). <em>Iraq security and humanitarian monitor: September 24-October 1, 2026.<\/em> https:\/\/enablingpeace.org\/ishm562\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[2] Al-Saray, A. (2026, October 24). <em>Baghdad suspects Israel of targeting Chinese aerial capabilities held by armed groups.<\/em> Asharq Al-Awsat. https:\/\/aawsat.com\/\u0634\u0624\u0648\u0646-\u0625\u0642\u0644\u064a\u0645\u064a\u0629\/5333161-\u0628\u063a\u062f\u0627\u062f-\u062a\u0634\u062a\u0628\u0647-\u0628\u0627\u0633\u062a\u0647\u062f\u0627\u0641-\u0625\u0633\u0631\u0627\u0626\u064a\u0644-\u0642\u062f\u0631\u0627\u062a-\u062c\u0648\u064a\u0629-\u0635\u064a\u0646\u064a\u0629-\u0644\u062f\u0649-\u0627\u0644\u0641\u0635\u0627\u0626\u0644<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[3] House of Commons Library. (2026). <em>A new president and prime minister for Iraq: What challenges face the country in 2026?<\/em> UK Parliament. https:\/\/commonslibrary.parliament.uk\/research-briefings\/cbp-10829\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[4] Alzrzoor, M. (2026, October 14). <em>ISIS in Iraq: Waning activity and persistent threat.<\/em> Iraq Center for Future Studies. https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/isis-in-iraq-waning-activity-and-persistent-threat\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[5] Raydan, N. (2026, October 21). <em>Iraq\u2019s energy challenges amid the Hormuz crisis.<\/em> The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https:\/\/www.washingtoninstitute.org\/policy-analysis\/iraqs-energy-challenges-amid-hormuz-crisis<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[6] International Monetary Fund. (2025). <em>Iraq: 2025 Article IV consultation &#8211; Staff report<\/em> (IMF Country Report No. 25\/183). https:\/\/www.elibrary.imf.org\/view\/journals\/002\/2025\/183\/article-A001-en.xml<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[7] World Bank. (2026). <em>From divide to opportunity: AI, jobs, and growth<\/em> (Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan Economic Update). https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1596\/978-1-4648-2364-0<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[8] Deutsche Welle. (2026, September 12). <em>Baghdad confirms attack on Saudi pipeline came from Iraq.<\/em> https:\/\/amp.dw.com\/en\/baghdad-confirms-attack-on-saudi-pipeline-came-from-iraq\/a-79247086<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">[9] The National. (2026, October 1). <em>Iraq confident it can disarm Iran-backed militias by June 2027, foreign minister says.<\/em> https:\/\/www.thenationalnews.com\/news\/us\/2026\/10\/01\/iraq-confident-it-can-disarm-iran-backed-militias-by-june-2027-foreign-minister-says\/<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Executive Summary Iraq is entering a sensitive period amid indications that military operations against Iran could resume, following a regional confrontation whose subsequent de-escalation did not develop into a durable settlement. The prospect of renewed escalation is exceptionally consequential for Baghdad, not only because of Iraq\u2019s geographic proximity and its political and economic ties with &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":2797,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"pagelayer_contact_templates":[],"_pagelayer_content":"","footnotes":"","_ppma_block_editor_authors":"{\"authors\":[198],\"author_categories\":{\"198\":\"1\"},\"fallback_author_user\":\"11\",\"ppma_author_box_select\":\"\",\"selected_authors\":[{\"id\":198,\"display_name\":\"Iraq Center for Future Studies\",\"is_guest\":1,\"category_id\":\"1\"}]}"},"categories":[26],"tags":[175,123,127,217,124],"ppma_author":[198],"class_list":["post-2915","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-policy-assessments","tag-175","tag-icfs","tag-iraq-en","tag-iraq-center-for-future-studies","tag-iraqcfs","author-iraq-center-for-future-studies"],"views":12,"authors":[{"term_id":198,"user_id":0,"is_guest":1,"slug":"iraq-center-for-future-studies","display_name":"Iraq Center for Future Studies","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/23423.png","url2x":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/23423.png"},"author_category":"1","first_name":"Iraq Center","last_name":"for Future Studies","user_url":"","job_title":"","description":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2915","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2915"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2915\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2916,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2915\/revisions\/2916"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2797"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2915"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2915"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2915"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2915"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}