{"id":2913,"date":"2026-11-05T09:18:14","date_gmt":"2026-11-05T09:18:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/?p=2913"},"modified":"2026-11-12T09:20:23","modified_gmt":"2026-11-12T09:20:23","slug":"washington-after-the-midterms-continuity-and-change-in-u-s-policy-toward-iraq","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/washington-after-the-midterms-continuity-and-change-in-u-s-policy-toward-iraq\/","title":{"rendered":"Washington After the Midterms: Continuity and Change in U.S. Policy Toward Iraq"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Executive Summary<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The U.S. midterm elections of 3 November 2026 reshaped Washington\u2019s institutional balance after the Democratic Party secured control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, while President Donald Trump retained control of the executive branch and command of the armed forces. For Iraq, the significance of the result lies not only in the change of congressional control, but also in the question of whether the new legislative majority can alter the instruments of a U.S. policy that has shown considerable continuity across successive administrations, particularly in its approach to armed groups, sanctions, the military presence and Iranian influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This paper argues that the election result raises the political cost of certain escalatory options for the White House and increases the likelihood of investigations, oversight and bargaining over funding. It does not, however, deprive the president of the authority to order military action within legal limits, nor does it eliminate the powers of the Treasury and State Departments to administer existing sanctions and designations. A distinction must therefore be drawn among changing a decision, constraining the means by which it is implemented, and changing the underlying strategic objective. These are three separate levels of analysis and should not be collapsed into a single conclusion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The paper compares three administrations &#8211; Trump\u2019s first term, the Biden administration and Trump\u2019s second term through the date of publication &#8211; before examining war powers, funding authority and congressional oversight, and assessing how the new balance in Washington may affect Baghdad in 2027. The scenarios presented here are not predictions of inevitable outcomes; they are conditional pathways shaped by the positions of U.S. institutions and developments in the regional environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>First: The Midterm Elections and the Redistribution of Power in Washington<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The significance of the midterm elections extends beyond the distribution of party seats. Their outcome affects the president\u2019s ability to pass legislation and appropriations, secure confirmation of senior officials, and work with committee chairs empowered to summon officials and open investigations. Announced results gave the Democrats majorities in both chambers, although some races remained unresolved when this assessment was prepared. The new majority will not begin exercising its institutional authority until the new Congress convenes in January 2027.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Control of Congress should not, however, be confused with control of foreign policy. The U.S. Constitution distributes authority between two branches. The president conducts diplomatic relations, serves as commander in chief and oversees the execution of federal law, while Congress holds the powers to declare war, legislate, appropriate funds and conduct oversight. A Democratic majority cannot by itself impose legislation on the president if he exercises the veto, unless it secures the two-thirds majority in both chambers required to override it. Some Senate legislation must also contend with the chamber\u2019s filibuster rules.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regionally, the election takes on added significance in the context of the U.S.-Iran confrontation and its economic and political repercussions. The campaign was shaped by debate over public spending, war and the cost of living. Yet popular opposition to the cost of conflict does not automatically translate into support for lifting sanctions on Iraqi armed groups or abandoning the protection of U.S. forces. This is where the distance becomes apparent between domestic electoral motivations and subsequent foreign-policy decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Second: Three Administrations and a Continuing U.S. Policy Toward Iraq<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A comparison of the first Trump administration (2017-2021), the Biden administration (2021-2025) and the second Trump administration (2025-2026) shows that the principal instruments of pressure neither began under a single administration nor disappeared when the governing party changed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">During Trump\u2019s first term, Asa\u2019ib Ahl al-Haq was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, while Harakat al-Nujaba was designated under the U.S. global terrorism sanctions framework. Late 2019 and early 2020 also saw U.S. military strikes inside Iraq. Escalation reached an exceptional level with the January 2020 strike in Baghdad that killed Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Under President Biden, strikes against Iran-aligned formations continued, particularly in 2021 and amid the escalation of attacks in 2023 and 2024. In November 2023, the administration designated Kata\u2019ib Sayyid al-Shuhada under the financial terrorism sanctions regime, followed by Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya in June 2024. Sanctions imposed in January 2024 also targeted Fly Baghdad and economic networks linked, according to U.S. allegations, to Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah. At the same time, Washington continued its dialogue with Baghdad on the transition of the international coalition\u2019s mission.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second Trump administration expanded the Foreign Terrorist Organization list in September 2025 by adding four Iraqi groups, including formations already designated under the terrorism sanctions regime. In October 2025, it imposed sanctions on companies and individuals accused of supporting networks connected to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iraqi armed groups. In April 2026, the Treasury Department designated seven leaders from different Iraqi groups. These measures demonstrate a widening of the legal and financial reach of some U.S. actions, but do not by themselves establish a fundamental change in strategic objectives.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The removal of sanctions from certain individuals or companies likewise does not necessarily indicate a broader change in Washington\u2019s position toward armed groups. Delisting may result from legal reviews or a change in the status of the entity concerned. The more useful test is whether removal is accompanied by an announced change in the strategy for dealing with armed organizations or in the conditions governing the security partnership with Baghdad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>FTO:<\/strong> Foreign Terrorist Organization<br><strong>SDGT:<\/strong> Specially Designated Global Terrorist<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-table\"><table class=\"has-fixed-layout\"><tbody><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Indicator<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Republicans &#8211; Trump (2017-2021 and 2025-2026)<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Democrats &#8211; Biden (2021-2025)<\/strong><\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Military strikes<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Strikes against armed groups inside Iraq, most notably in December 2019; the targeting of Soleimani and al-Muhandis in January 2020; and strikes in March 2020.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Strikes against armed groups inside Iraq, most notably in December 2023 and January and February 2024.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Financial sanctions<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Sanctions on leaders, companies and financial networks linked to Iraqi armed groups and Iran.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Sanctions on leaders, companies and financial networks, including Fly Baghdad and six individuals linked to Kata\u2019ib Hezbollah.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Terrorism designations<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Five new FTO designations, including Asa\u2019ib Ahl al-Haq during Trump\u2019s first term and four Iraqi groups during his second, in addition to SDGT designations.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Two armed groups designated under the SDGT regime: Kata\u2019ib Sayyid al-Shuhada in 2023 and Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya in 2024.<\/td><\/tr><tr><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\"><strong>Pressure concerning Iraqi legislation<\/strong><\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Public U.S. opposition to the 2025 Popular Mobilization Forces bill and diplomatic pressure to prevent its passage.<\/td><td class=\"has-text-align-center\" data-align=\"center\">Political and security pressure concerning armed groups, alongside reports of non-public pressure over legislation.<\/td><\/tr><\/tbody><\/table><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Third: What Can a Democratic Congress Constrain<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first legal difficulty lies in distinguishing between declaring war and ordering military strikes. The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war but designates the president commander in chief. Successive administrations have conducted limited strikes without a formal declaration of war, relying on the defence of U.S. forces, existing authorizations, or broad interpretations of Article II of the Constitution. A Democratic majority therefore does not automatically acquire the right to approve every strike against an Iraqi armed group in advance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The War Powers Resolution of 1973 imposes consultation and reporting requirements, including a report within 48 hours in the circumstances specified by the resolution. In covered cases, it generally requires the termination of the use of U.S. forces in hostilities within 60 days in the absence of appropriate legislative authorization, subject to a limited additional withdrawal period under specified conditions. Disagreement between Congress and the executive branch over the definition of hostilities and the constitutional basis of certain operations, however, makes these limits contested in practice. They do not constitute an immediate mechanism for preventing an initial strike.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Congress has clearer authority to withhold a new authorization for war, deny additional appropriations, or attach conditions to funding. Restricting funds already appropriated, or enacting binding legislation to halt an ongoing operation, may nevertheless require political negotiation with the president or enough votes to override a veto. Democratic committee chairs can hold hearings on the objectives, legal basis, casualties and cost of military operations. Such oversight can raise the political cost of sustained escalation and disclose new information, but it does not guarantee a change in executive policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the Iraqi context, the effectiveness of these tools varies according to the type of operation. A limited, rapid strike is less susceptible to prior constraint. A prolonged military campaign is more exposed to funding restrictions and congressional oversight, while a wider regional war would generate a larger debate over authorization, resources and human cost. Existing economic sanctions and designations are more capable of continuing through administrative action, provided they rest on operative legal authorities and the conditions governing their application remain unchanged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Fourth: Where the Central Constraints Lie<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The central issue is not the transfer of the congressional majority from Republicans to Democrats in itself, but the distinction between possible agreement on policy objectives and disagreement over the instruments used to pursue them. The parties may differ over the timing of war, the scale of military involvement, the cost of overseas deployments and the limits of presidential authority. They may nevertheless converge on protecting U.S. forces, containing Iranian influence and pursuing entities designated as terrorist organizations. Describing the new Congress as opposed to Trump is therefore insufficient grounds for concluding that it will oppose every decision he makes concerning Iraq.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A second constraint arises from the tension between Iraq\u2019s interest in confining security decision-making to the state and the U.S. position toward formations that are legally incorporated into Iraqi security institutions but remain subject to U.S. designations or sanctions. This overlap allows pressure on a particular entity to affect salaries, contracts, financial transfers and security cooperation without necessarily amounting to a designation of the institution as a whole. Iraqi actors, meanwhile, view some U.S. interventions as encroachments on sovereignty and the prerogatives of Iraq\u2019s legislative institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The third constraint is Iraq\u2019s position within the U.S.-Iran equation. The more the behaviour of Iraqi armed groups is interpreted exclusively through the lens of U.S.-Iran confrontation, the narrower the scope for engaging Baghdad as an independent partner with its own interests and domestic balances. Conversely, the more the bilateral relationship expands into the economy, energy, financial reform and civilian cooperation, the more feasible it becomes, at least in principle, to separate the security dispute from the wider partnership. The success of such separation is not a unilateral U.S. decision; it also depends on the Iraqi state\u2019s capacity to control military decision-making and manage its international obligations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The decisive question for 2027 is therefore not whether Democrats will stop Trump, but in which policy area they possess both sufficient political will and institutional capacity to constrain a specific measure. Opposition to a broad war may be strong while agreement on sanctions remains intact. Congressional scrutiny may intensify without a single designation of an Iraqi armed group being amended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Fifth: The Future of U.S. Pressure on Baghdad<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>First, the military file.<\/strong> The White House may continue limited operations against targets it links to threats against U.S. forces and interests. Any geographic or temporal expansion of those operations, however, would increase the importance of Congress in debates over authorization and funding. Baghdad should distinguish between operational warning indicators and signs of legislative change. Political statements alone do not prevent strikes, whereas changes to funding rules or statutory authorization may affect the ability to sustain them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Second, the Popular Mobilization Forces file.<\/strong> The proposed legislation in 2025 drew public U.S. objections based on Washington\u2019s concern that it could entrench the influence of Iran-aligned formations within state institutions. Documenting this opposition is not sufficient to establish it as the sole reason the legislation stalled, since Iraqi political and institutional disagreements also shaped the outcome. It would be methodologically unsound to assume that a Democratic Congress will automatically adopt a different position, because U.S. objections are more closely connected to command and control and to existing designations than to the identity of the party in power alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Third, the financial sphere.<\/strong> Sanctions have an institutional durability that extends beyond the electoral cycle. Banks, companies and intermediaries respond to compliance requirements and legal risks even in the absence of new measures. Congress may intensify oversight of sanctions enforcement or their unintended effects, but that does not amount to their repeal. The Iraqi banking sector, dollar transfers and commercial entities linked to designated parties therefore remain among the areas in which policy continuity is most likely to have practical consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Fourth, the security relationship.<\/strong> The future of the international coalition is distinct from the terrorist designation of Iraqi armed groups. Training, advisory arrangements and intelligence cooperation may advance while sanctions remain in place, just as some areas of cooperation may stall amid escalation. This duality does not necessarily represent a contradiction in U.S. policy. It reflects the distinction between Washington\u2019s partnership with the Iraqi government and its dispute with particular armed actors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Fifth, the economy and energy.<\/strong> Iraq has room to broaden the bilateral agenda beyond security issues, but doing so requires progress on financial transparency, investment and contractual obligations. Congress cannot impose a comprehensive economic policy on Baghdad, but it can exert influence through assistance, oversight and conditions attached to some appropriations. U.S. executive agencies retain other instruments capable of affecting international transactions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Sixth: Pathways for 2027 and Indicators for Testing Them<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Pathway One: Continuity in the overall direction of policy under stronger oversight.<\/strong> Designations, sanctions and security cooperation remain in place, while hearings and demands for explanations of military decisions become more frequent. This pathway can be tested by monitoring the work of the foreign relations, armed services and appropriations committees and by comparing political statements with binding decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Pathway Two: Restrictions on some forms of military escalation while financial and legal pressure continues.<\/strong> Legislative initiatives emerge concerning war powers or the funding of specific operations, without a comprehensive review of terrorism lists. The relevant indicator is not the number of statements opposing war, but the passage of enforceable legal provisions or consequential agreements on appropriations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Pathway Three: A restructuring of the terms of the relationship with Baghdad.<\/strong> Negotiations over the security mission, financial governance and the place of armed formations within the official chain of command acquire greater importance as U.S.-Iran competition continues. Evidence for this pathway would consist of written understandings and reciprocal Iraqi and U.S. implementation measures, rather than a change in diplomatic rhetoric alone.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Several factors could alter any of these pathways. The most important are a major attack on U.S. forces, an expansion of confrontation with Iran, a change in congressional priorities caused by a domestic crisis, or the success of Iraqi arrangements that reduce sources of friction. The assessment should therefore be updated when one of these variables emerges, rather than treating the election result as a sufficient explanation for every subsequent decision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Historical comparison indicates that U.S. policy toward Iraq has retained a core set of instruments across three successive administrations, even as the scope, intensity and context of their use have varied. The midterm election result changes the institutional environment in which Trump operates; it does not transfer the direction of foreign policy to the Democratic Party. Congress can raise the cost of a prolonged war, scrutinize its legality, and bargain with the administration over funding and appointments. A change in the congressional majority alone, however, does not give it the power to prevent every military strike or revoke existing designations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For Baghdad, the real test lies in distinguishing between U.S. pressure directed at the conduct of specific armed groups and broader pressure that affects the state\u2019s economic and security institutions. The appropriate measure of change in Washington should not be partisan rhetoric, but the number and nature of decisions that are actually amended, the legislative constraints that enter into force, and their tangible effects on military strikes, sanctions and the bilateral relationship. The election is therefore a meaningful variable in the mechanisms of U.S. decision-making, but it does not by itself demonstrate a change in Washington\u2019s strategic objectives toward Iraq.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Executive Summary The U.S. midterm elections of 3 November 2026 reshaped Washington\u2019s institutional balance after the Democratic Party secured control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, while President Donald Trump retained control of the executive branch and command of the armed forces. For Iraq, the significance of the result lies not only &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":2834,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"pagelayer_contact_templates":[],"_pagelayer_content":"","footnotes":"","_ppma_block_editor_authors":"{\"authors\":[198],\"author_categories\":{\"198\":\"1\"},\"fallback_author_user\":\"11\",\"ppma_author_box_select\":\"\",\"selected_authors\":[{\"id\":198,\"display_name\":\"Iraq Center for Future Studies\",\"is_guest\":1,\"category_id\":\"1\"}]}"},"categories":[26,40],"tags":[175,123,121,217],"ppma_author":[198],"class_list":["post-2913","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-policy-assessments","category-40","tag-175","tag-icfs","tag-iraq-2","tag-iraq-center-for-future-studies","author-iraq-center-for-future-studies"],"views":8,"authors":[{"term_id":198,"user_id":0,"is_guest":1,"slug":"iraq-center-for-future-studies","display_name":"Iraq Center for Future Studies","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/23423.png","url2x":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/23423.png"},"author_category":"1","first_name":"Iraq Center","last_name":"for Future Studies","user_url":"","job_title":"","description":""}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2913","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2913"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2913\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2914,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2913\/revisions\/2914"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2834"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2913"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2913"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2913"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2913"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}