{"id":2905,"date":"2026-11-11T08:46:11","date_gmt":"2026-11-11T08:46:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/?p=2905"},"modified":"2026-11-12T14:47:14","modified_gmt":"2026-11-12T14:47:14","slug":"sunni-religious-groups-and-political-competition-in-iraq","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/sunni-religious-groups-and-political-competition-in-iraq\/","title":{"rendered":"Sunni Religious Groups and Political Competition in Iraq"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">1. Executive Summary<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The fall of Iraq&#8217;s political system in 2003 fundamentally reconfigured the relationship between Sunni religious life and politics. Organizations emerged from clandestine activity and exile; mosques assumed expanded roles in relief, guidance, and community protection; and multiple actors began claiming to speak for Sunni communities. These developments did not produce a unified religious or political leadership. Instead, they opened a field of competition among political parties, religious outreach movements, Sufi orders, councils of religious scholars, and armed resistance factions. The relative standing of these actors shifted with the occupation, sectarian violence, the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS), and the subsequent liberation of territories under its control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This study examines those transformations across three broad currents: movements rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood tradition, Sufism in both organized and customary forms, and the various strands of Salafism. It treats Madkhali Salafism as a particularly revealing case of political participation without formal party organization. The analysis proceeds from the premise that a group&#8217;s religious worldview and its scholars&#8217; positions shape its choices among political engagement, protest, and abstention from party politics. Its actual capacity to exercise influence, however, also depends on relationships with security agencies, religious endowment authorities, political parties, and local communities, as well as its ability to retain leaders, personnel, and venues for religious activity through successive crises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Iraqi Islamic Party, historically linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, possessed early organizational experience that enabled it to enter post-2003 state institutions. Its broadly Islamic discourse also enabled it to appeal to constituencies with diverse religious backgrounds. Yet participation amid occupation, violence, and security crises\u2014followed by shortcomings in governance, internal divisions, and the emergence of local leaders\u2014gradually undermined its capacity to dominate Sunni political representation [1]. The wider activist Islamist tradition persisted through multiple organizations, while politicians originating in that milieu increasingly appeared within broader coalitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sufism, by contrast, constitutes a social and religious sphere much wider than the organizations operating in its name. The Kasnazani order, the Muhammadan Ribat, and the Naqshbandi-associated armed movement illustrate divergent modes of engagement: electoral alliances, institutional representation, and, in a particular historical context, armed activity. None represents Sufism as a whole, nor does shared religious practice confer upon a single leadership the right to speak for all traditionally observant Sunnis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Salafism in Iraq likewise encompasses distinct orientations. Some prioritize education and religious outreach; others engage in organized politics or have embraced armed action. They differ over obedience to rulers, protest, and electoral participation. Within the Madkhali current, some scholars distinguish between joining a political party\u2014which they reject\u2014and voting for a candidate, publicly endorsing one, or communicating with officials, practices they may permit according to their assessment of the public interest. They link these positions to obedience to those in authority in what is right and to the avoidance of confrontation [2]. Statements and meetings involving such scholars in 2025 [3], alongside documented electoral endorsements [4], establish public political involvement by particular individuals. They do not establish a single Iraqi leadership or prove that all their followers supported the same candidate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The study concludes that the post-ISIS period altered the arenas in which Sunni religious groups compete for influence. Mosque administration, the appointment of imams and preachers, official recognition of religious bodies, and local alliances acquired greater importance in determining opportunities for activity and influence. Within this setting, figures associated with Madkhali Salafism have engaged politically outside party structures through electoral endorsements and contact with state officials, while Brotherhood-oriented organizations and Sufi institutions have pursued different strategies according to their structures and local positions. Each group&#8217;s weight ultimately depends on its capacity to sustain organized activity, represent its constituency&#8217;s demands, and deliver tangible results within its immediate environment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">2. Introduction and Methodology<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">How have Sunni religious groups in Iraq moved, since 2003, from an emphasis on religious formation, education, and the cultivation of communal ties toward political representation, alliance-building, and competition over institutions? And how, within this transformation, have Salafis opposed to party politics developed a political presence? The study recognizes significant variations in these groups&#8217; size and organizational centralization and seeks to explain the divergent trajectories and conditions that have strengthened or weakened their influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Its central hypothesis is that the collapse of the former system of state control, followed by war and changing security conditions, transformed the practical terms of political engagement more decisively than doctrinal foundations alone. A group with an established educational network and an accepted leadership can become a political force when it encounters a constituency seeking representation and an institution or ally willing to respond to its demands. Conversely, an established party may decline when it loses public confidence, while a Sufi order may preserve considerable social influence without converting it into a comparable electoral vote.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The study employs a historical-analytical approach, combining qualitative comparisons of Brotherhood-oriented, Sufi, and Salafi organizations with a chronological examination of their movement among boycott, participation, protest, violence, and negotiation. Its principal period of inquiry extends from 2003 to the completion of the research on 5 November 2026, preceded by background on the Baathist period, the Gulf War, and the Faith Campaign. It focuses on Arab Sunni milieus, particularly Baghdad, Anbar, Salah al-Din, Nineveh, and Diyala, without claiming to encompass all Kurdish Islamist movements or to measure religiosity across Iraqi society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A <em>religious organization<\/em> is understood here as a durable framework with an identifiable religious authority or leadership and activities that can be traced over time. It may take the form of a party, movement, Sufi order, council of scholars, or locally organized network centered on clerics and educational institutions. <em>Political participation<\/em> includes candidacy, alliances, electoral endorsement, mobilization, mediation, and negotiation over the governance of religious institutions. These forms are distinguished both from diffuse social religiosity and from the mere attendance of a public official at a religious occasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The study draws on academic scholarship, research-center publications, legal documents, organizational statements, publicly attributed remarks, and local reporting. Organizations&#8217; own communications are used as evidence of what they report about their leadership and activities; disputed accounts are attributed to their sources; and evidence that a relationship exists is distinguished from interpretations of its consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">3. Historical Roots Before 2003<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">3.1 Social Religiosity and Organization Before the Faith Campaign<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sunni religious life in Iraq long predates both the Faith Campaign and the emergence of modern Islamist parties. It developed through mosques, schools of Islamic jurisprudence, scholarly families, and Sufi orders, alongside traditions of hadith scholarship and religious reform. For some scholars and observant Muslims, adherence to the Hanafi or Shafi&#8217;i school of jurisprudence coexisted with Sufi religious formation or reformist commitments. This legacy helps explain why Iraqi Sunni religiosity is more extensive and diverse than formal membership in political parties or religious movements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The organizational roots of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq reach back to the 1940s and are associated with figures including Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawwaf and Amjad al-Zahawi. The Iraqi Islamic Party subsequently emerged in 1960. Educational organization, student activism, and social work furnished experience in recruitment and maintaining networks. Yet repression, clandestine activity, and exile prevented that accumulated capacity from being tested through sustained open political competition before 2003 [5]. The movement therefore enjoyed an organizational head start over many later Sunni political actors, without this necessarily establishing it as the largest political force in Iraqi society as a whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Salafism, too, has a history preceding the 1990s, rooted in religious writing, hadith study, teaching circles, and limited attempts at organization. It was neither a homogeneous bloc nor an exact counterpart of any particular Saudi Salafi current. Yahya al-Kubaisi documents attempts at organized activity and disagreements over violence and methods of dissemination [6]. Portraying pre-Faith Campaign Salafism as free from internal controversy or state repression would thus oversimplify its history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">3.2 The Gulf War and the Faith Campaign<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Baathist state combined tight regulation of religious life with selective use of religious institutions. Mosques, preaching, and religious education operated under licensing and surveillance, although relations between individual scholars and the authorities varied. Drawing on Baath Party archives, Samuel Helfont demonstrates that the Faith Campaign launched in 1993 relied on state agencies and institutions for monitoring and direction [7]. It did not signify the state&#8217;s withdrawal from the administration of religion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Iraq&#8217;s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the 1991 Gulf War transformed relations between Baghdad and Riyadh, making Iraqi authorities more suspicious of currents they associated with Saudi Arabia [8]. During the 1990s, religious activity expanded, while the regime restricted certain Salafi actors and selectively supported other scholars and religious groups [9]. Religious expansion under the Faith Campaign therefore coincided with continued state supervision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The authorities also strengthened their connections with Sufi scholars and networks. Certain Naqshbandi ties intersected with the standing of Vice President Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri. David Jordan shows that these relationships had institutional and social histories [10]. Their political deployment does not reduce Sufism to an instrument of the regime, nor does it make every order or Sufi lodge an extension of Baathist institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This history left religious actors with unequal resources after the regime&#8217;s collapse. Some possessed experience of underground party organization; others retained mosques, schools, and social authority; still others had connections within the former state. With the breakdown of state control in 2003, these different resources became assets in a contest over religious legitimacy and community representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">4. Mapping Religious Groups and Forms of Participation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">4.1 Salafism: Religious Outreach, Politics, and Armed Action<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Salafism is a religious orientation grounded in a return to the Qur&#8217;an, the Prophetic Sunna, and the understanding of the early Muslim generations (<em>al-salaf<\/em>). It places particular emphasis on creed, hadith, and the correction of religious practice. It does not, however, prescribe a single political position. Quintan Wiktorowicz&#8217;s distinction among purist, political, and jihadi orientations offers a useful framework for understanding different modes of action [11], provided it is not mechanically imposed on Iraq as a fixed set of separate organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Discourses within Salafism frequently invoke the division of the Muslim community into sects and the concept of the \u201csaved sect\u201d (<em>al-firqa al-najiya<\/em>) as criteria for religious correctness and differentiation from competing methodologies. These concepts acquire organizational significance when they inform recommendations about which scholar to study under or warnings against other scholars. The selection of legitimate sources of learning then also helps define communal boundaries. Yet agreement on such principles settles neither electoral attitudes nor organizational unity; Salafis may disagree sharply over who authentically represents the same religious methodology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Scholarly and proselytizing Salafi circles concentrate on teaching, textual scholarship, preaching, and the training of students of religious knowledge, operating through mosques, educational centers, and networks of teachers. Political views within these circles vary. Some avoid party activity, others participate as individuals or endorse political figures, and they differ over obedience to the authorities, the limits of public dissent, the permissibility of party organization, and protest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The current commonly called <em>Madkhalism<\/em>, after Rabi&#8217; al-Madkhali, belongs within this wider field. Like other Salafi circles, it emphasizes learning and religious outreach, but is distinguished by its particular scholarly reference points, insistence on obedience to legitimate authority, rejection of factional party affiliation (<em>tahazzub<\/em>), and positions toward rival currents. In this sense, \u201cscholarly\u201d describes the character of an activity, whereas \u201cMadkhali\u201d identifies a specific current within Salafism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Politically activist Salafism (<em>al-salafiyya al-harakiyya<\/em>) gives greater weight to collective mobilization and questions of governance and society. Certain strands draw on the <em>Sahwa<\/em> (Islamic Awakening) or Sururi tradition. Despite overlapping intellectual literature, they remain organizationally distinct from the Muslim Brotherhood. Their differences with anti-party Salafis concern protest, public criticism, cooperation with parties, and who is entitled to determine political expediency. Describing a group as activist does not imply that it supports armed struggle or consistently adopts the same electoral position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Jihadi Salafism regards armed struggle as an instrument of political transformation and justifies it through particular interpretations of legitimate rule and the laws of warfare. It became prominent in Iraq after 2003 within a broader armed landscape encompassing Iraqi Islamist factions of varying ideological backgrounds and political objectives, including the Islamic Army in Iraq [12]. Although these groups and al-Qaeda fought American forces, they disagreed over pledges of allegiance, attacks on civilians, national identity, and the future political order. Disputes between some factions and al-Qaeda escalated into armed confrontations [13].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Three broad trajectories emerged from this wider armed environment. Some actors withdrew from armed activity and receded from public view. Others linked to factions with Salafi backgrounds, including figures from the milieu of the Islamic Army in Iraq, continued to voice opposition outside armed activity. A third trajectory involved the persistence of armed violence and the expansion of <em>takfir<\/em>\u2014the declaration of fellow Muslims as unbelievers\u2014among organizations descending from al-Qaeda&#8217;s Iraqi branch. This line evolved from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi&#8217;s organization, renamed al-Qaeda in Iraq after his pledge to Osama bin Laden, through the Islamic State of Iraq and later the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Attitudes toward rulers and methods of political change constitute a central line of division within Salafism. In Iraq, a current described in scholarship and controversy as Madkhali has gained prominence over the past two decades. It overlaps on some questions with the tendency known as <em>Jamism<\/em>, associated with Muhammad Aman al-Jami. Both emphasize study of the Qur&#8217;an and Sunna according to the early generations, a concern they share with other Salafis. Their distinctive political emphasis is obedience to those in authority, rejection of rebellion and party factionalism, and criticism of activist Salafi trends such as Sururism and of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some Iraqi scholars described as Madkhali reject that designation and identify simply as Salafis [14]. This study uses the term analytically to identify the current under examination and subsequently considers how certain associated figures combine opposition to party organization with electoral endorsements, mediation, and engagement with officials.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">4.2 The Murji&#8217;a Label and Abu Manar al-Alami<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Murji&#8217;a<\/em> is a historical theological designation associated with debates over the definition of faith and its relationship to deeds. In contemporary polemics, it is also deployed against figures accused by their opponents of excessive deference to rulers or of justifying government policies [15]. In this study it does not denote a separate Iraqi organization and is not interchangeable with Madkhalism. An accusation of <em>irja&#8217;<\/em> does not in itself establish the identity or organizational affiliation of the person concerned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Lorem Ipsum has been the industry&#8217;s standard dummy text ever since the 1500s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Muhammad Khudayr al-Juburi, known as Abu Manar al-Alami, is a notable figure in Salah al-Din whose views on resistance to American forces and participation in post-2003 institutions provoked controversy. In an interview published on 24 May 2025, he said that he had permitted people in Tikrit and Salah al-Din to work in institutions established after the occupation. He also stated that in 2003 he had written a work titled <em>Dahr al-Mathlab fi Tawliyat al-Muslim &#8216;ala al-Muslim min al-Kafir al-Mutaghallib<\/em> [16], in the context of arguments against armed resistance to American occupying forces and concerning authority obtained through force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Critics associated this position with <em>irja&#8217;<\/em>. Abu Manar, however, rejected the Madkhali label, described his disagreement with Rabi&#8217; al-Madkhali, and criticized what he called excessive disparagement of scholars. His case demonstrates that acceptance of work within state institutions may arise from different religious frameworks. It also shows that Salafi disagreements extend beyond resistance versus institutional participation to encompass authority to commend scholars, the boundaries of scholarly criticism, and claims to represent the religious mission. His surrounding local networks should not be reclassified as a party named the Murji&#8217;a.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">4.3 The Muslim Brotherhood: Between Religious Movement and Political Vehicle<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Muslim Brotherhood tradition combines religious formation, organization, social work, and participation in governance. It regards institution-building, elections, and alliances as legitimate means of effecting change. Its Iraqi experience was distinguished by an organizational history preceding 2003, providing personnel and public-action experience when political life reopened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Iraqi Islamic Party was the most prominent party-political expression of that history. It did not, however, represent every person who voted for or cooperated with it. Broad Islamic discourse and local interests could bring together individuals with Salafi sympathies or Sufi training under a single electoral platform without making them organizational members of the Brotherhood. This helps explain why the party&#8217;s wider electorate could be larger than the movement&#8217;s formal membership, and why partners within the same electoral vehicle continued to differ on doctrine and religious outreach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Membership in the Muslim Brotherhood is distinct from membership in the Iraqi Islamic Party; an alliance with the party is different again from endorsing its list in a particular election. Attributing a political decision to the Brotherhood leadership requires evidence of its actual role, even when the decision-maker formerly belonged to the movement. Similarly, a Salafi scholar&#8217;s endorsement of an Islamist candidate establishes a particular electoral preference; proof of membership in the Brotherhood requires separate evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Justice and Benevolence Movement (<em>Harakat al-&#8216;Adl wa-l-Ihsan<\/em>) emerged as a publicly identified framework for religious outreach, education, and social activity. In statements made in 2024, Iraqi Islamic Party secretary-general Rashid al-Azzawi said that the party had left the Muslim Brotherhood in 2011 and described the Movement as the Brotherhood&#8217;s organizational framework in Iraq [17]. This distinction separates the party from the movement despite their shared intellectual and personnel histories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Movement relies on the lists of larger political forces to improve its candidates&#8217; prospects of entering parliament. In the 2025 elections it participated within the Azm Alliance led by Muthanna al-Samarrai. Its figures had previously contested elections on lists associated with National Resolve, Taqaddum, and Sovereignty. Its candidates may appear on more than one alliance list in different governorates during the same electoral cycle. Its parliamentary representation is estimated at two to three members per term. Movement between these political groupings illustrates the importance of larger coalitions in sustaining its parliamentary presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">4.4 Sufism as a Broad Social Sphere<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sufism has deep roots in Iraqi society through religious schooling, the <em>takiyya<\/em> or Sufi lodge, collective remembrance (<em>dhikr<\/em>), visitation practices, and the standing of sheikhs and scholarly families. A religiously observant person may receive Sufi formation without formal membership in an order, or combine it with unrelated party activity. The Qadiriyya, Naqshbandiyya, Kasnazaniyya, and Muhammadan Ribat are therefore particular cases within a larger field, not an exhaustive representation of Iraqi Sufism or traditional jurisprudential religiosity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A Sufi order acquires collective capacity through connections between its leadership, disciples, representatives, lodges, and recurring religious gatherings. Its translation into political participation depends on its leadership&#8217;s statements and alliances and on the responsiveness of the wider community. This can produce electoral endorsement, mediation, or institutional relationships without the formation of a party bearing the order&#8217;s name.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Kasnazani order illustrates the connection between Sufi leadership and an explicitly political framework. Nehru al-Kasnazani has combined leadership of the order with the presidency of the Iraqi Unity Gathering in alliance statements [18]. This differs from unorganized social Sufism because alliance decisions are publicly attributed to an identifiable leadership, even though the order&#8217;s disciples are more numerous than those who necessarily accept its electoral choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Lorem Ipsum has been the industry&#8217;s standard dummy text ever since the 1500s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Muhammadan Ribat traces its initial emergence to Haditha in Anbar in 2014, amid resistance to ISIS. Its presence there was associated with the al-Alusi family, with Abd al-Qadir Bahjat al-Alusi emerging as chair of its Council of Scholars [19]. The Ribat operates as a Sufi-oriented religious body with local representatives and activities in education, preaching, and religious gatherings, alongside contact with political, security, and tribal actors. It differs in origins and functions both from hereditary Sufi orders and from electoral parties. The Iraqi Fiqh Council, the Iraqi Scholars Association, and other fatwa institutions are separate bodies with distinct histories and mandates, even where some of their positions overlap with those of the Ribat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, by contrast, was an armed organization that appeared in the post-invasion period and was linked to leaders and networks of the former regime. It does not represent all Naqshbandis or Sufi orders. Its inclusion illustrates the range of political practices that have arisen within environments associated with Sufism, from cooperation with the state and party alliances to armed opposition under particular historical conditions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">4.5 Scholarly Institutions and Other Religious Outreach Groups<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These traditions intersected with bodies claiming to represent religious scholars or Sunni communities. They included the Association of Muslim Scholars, in which Harith al-Dari became prominent after 2003 [20], the Iraqi Fiqh Council, and the Sunni Endowment Office [21]. A state institution with administrative powers differs from a scholarly association whose authority rests on recognition by its members; both differ from a political party competing for seats. Overlapping scholarly memberships and social ties enabled cross-tradition cooperation without creating a single Iraqi Sunni religious authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Tablighi Jamaat (<em>Jama&#8217;at al-Da&#8217;wa wa-l-Tabligh<\/em>) offers a model of organized religious activity concentrated on preaching, moral reform, and journeys undertaken for religious outreach. Its distinction from the Muslim Brotherhood concerns the organization&#8217;s primary purpose: political participation forms part of the Brotherhood&#8217;s program, whereas the Tablighi Jamaat&#8217;s collective activity centers on preaching and religious formation. Political positions adopted personally by some members remain distinct from the group&#8217;s organizational orientation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">5. Occupation, Resistance, and the Construction of Representation, 2003\u20132007<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">5.1 How the Fall of the Regime Reshaped the Religious Sphere<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The 2003 US-led invasion brought parties and individuals back from exile and enabled religious groups to move from clandestine to public activity. At the same time, the security and administrative arrangements that had regulated religious institutions collapsed. The dissolution of the Ministry of Awqaf and redistribution of its powers among separate endowment offices multiplied the authorities responsible for mosques. Sectarian affiliations and local interests increasingly shaped appointments, control of endowed property, and religious representation [22].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The new occupation-era institutions confronted Sunni actors with three connected questions: Was participation in these bodies legitimate? Was armed resistance to the occupation justified? And who could protect local populations and represent their demands? The Iraqi Islamic Party chose participation in governing institutions, whereas other religious bodies and individuals rejected or challenged that course. Salafi and Sufi circles themselves were divided among participation, refusal, and caution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Some actors sought a common representative umbrella, as in the late-2003 <em>Shura Gathering of Ahl al-Sunna wa-l-Jama&#8217;a<\/em>, which included figures from Brotherhood, Sufi, and Salafi backgrounds [23]. The initiative demonstrated the possibility of cross-current cooperation, but leadership competition and divergent attitudes toward the occupation and the new institutions limited its ability to secure encompassing representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">5.2 Armed Factions and Their Attitudes Toward the Occupation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Iraqi factions fighting American forces included the Islamic Army in Iraq, the 1920 Revolution Brigades, and the Mujahideen Army, alongside transnational jihadi organizations. Their motivations encompassed national, religious, and local concerns; they differed in their visions for a future political order, relations with communities, and positions on attacks against civilians. These differences appear in the factions&#8217; own statements and proclaimed aims and are examined by the International Crisis Group [24].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In late 2006, following Saddam Hussein&#8217;s execution, the Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order announced its existence. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri and connections to officers from former state institutions featured prominently. Michael Knights shows that the organization combined Naqshbandi religious symbolism with nationalist rhetoric, military experience, and local networks. Its political and organizational project was distinct from al-Qaeda&#8217;s, despite some operational overlaps under particular circumstances [25]. These links concern an armed organization employing the order&#8217;s name and symbols; Sufi lodges, gatherings, and ordinary adherents should not be included in that description without evidence connecting them to the organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Splits in 2007 and the formation of new alliances further clarified differences among armed factions. Mohammad Abu Rumman identifies the proximity of Hamas in Iraq and the Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance to Brotherhood-oriented thinking and discusses estimates of their political connections with the Iraqi Islamic Party [26]. Such evidence should be read in terms of demonstrable affinity or contact. Describing any faction as the party&#8217;s military wing would require separate evidence of organizational subordination and party control over its decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Within Salafi circles, some scholars rejected fighting American forces, while others argued that working in the police and administration better protected civilians; still others concentrated on teaching and preaching. The legitimacy of armed combat and institutional employment was thus disputed within Salafism itself, and some of its currents adopted participation in state institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">5.3 The Iraqi Islamic Party: Participation and Its Costs<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Iraqi Islamic Party entered governing institutions in July 2003 when the Coalition Provisional Authority selected its then secretary-general, Muhsin Abd al-Hamid, for the Iraqi Governing Council [27]. This was an appointed role at a time when participation in occupation-established institutions was deeply contested within Sunni circles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Lorem Ipsum has been the industry&#8217;s standard dummy text ever since the 1500s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The party withdrew from the January 2005 Transitional National Assembly election but participated in the December parliamentary election through the Iraqi Accord Front, which won 44 seats [28]. In April 2006 its secretary-general, Tariq al-Hashimi, was elected vice president [29]. The party thus moved from appointment to the Governing Council, through parliamentary representation in an electoral alliance, to participation in the presidency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This occurred amid al-Qaeda&#8217;s activities, militia violence, and escalating sectarian conflict. In May 2005 US forces arrested Muhsin Abd al-Hamid, subsequently released him, and acknowledged that his detention had been a mistake [30]. On 28 November that year, Iyad Ahmad Atiya al-Izzi, a member of the party&#8217;s political bureau, was assassinated. In 2006 Maysun al-Hashimi, who headed the party&#8217;s women&#8217;s bureau, was also assassinated [31].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Losses continued beyond this period. On 12 June 2009 Harith al-Ubaydi, head of the Iraqi Accord Front&#8217;s parliamentary bloc and deputy chair of the Human Rights Committee, was assassinated. Arrests and killings constrained the party&#8217;s ability to organize, move freely, and communicate with its electorate and form an essential part of the context in which its institutional choices and performance must be evaluated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">5.4 Mosques, Mutual Aid, and Local Protection<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After the regime&#8217;s collapse, mosques became major points of contact between religious figures and residents in many Sunni areas. Preaching was combined with mutual assistance and emergency relief, roles that expanded as displacement increased and services failed. During sectarian conflict, the authority of the pulpit became bound up with neighborhood security and the capacity of preachers and local notables to seek protection or mediate tensions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Mosques came under attack, and religious figures were killed or displaced [32]. Control over certain mosques and endowed properties also became a matter of dispute between the Sunni and Shia Endowment Offices [33], while other mosques faced security restrictions. Those responsible for mosques consequently became more dependent on actors capable of providing protection or interceding with the authorities. In some areas, maintaining a preaching position became contingent on local balances of power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">6. The Awakening Movements, Political Participation, and Protest, 2007\u20132013<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Sunni Awakening movements began taking shape in Anbar in 2006 and expanded during 2007 as confrontation with al-Qaeda intensified. This shift gave tribal and local leaders greater roles in security management and negotiation with the government. Competition subsequently extended to elections and state institutions, while disputes over detention, discrimination, and political representation persisted, resurfacing forcefully in the protests that began in late 2012.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">6.1 The Formation of the Awakening and Shifts in Local Power<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Awakening emerged in Anbar through an alliance of tribal and local forces prominently led by Abd al-Sattar Abu Risha. It developed amid growing conflict with al-Qaeda over enforced pledges of allegiance, interference in communal affairs, and challenges to the authority of tribes and other factions. These forces cooperated with US troops against al-Qaeda. Similar security arrangements spread to other areas in 2007 [34], with different participating actors and local circumstances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Participation in security provision strengthened Awakening leaders&#8217; bargaining position over incorporating their members into the security services or providing civilian employment. This diversified the actors claiming to speak on behalf of communities. The Iraqi Islamic Party and religious institutions now had to deal with leaders possessing independent tribal and operational influence. As electoral participation expanded, part of this competition moved into provincial councils and parliament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">6.2 Elections and the Erosion of Unified Sunni Representation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The elections of 2009 and 2010 expanded opportunities for Sunni leaders to run on lists that did not foreground an Islamist identity. The Iraqiya list exemplified a cross-cutting political vehicle bringing together diverse figures [35]. This demonstrated that voters could change their political representation without necessarily abandoning their religious commitments, and that religious credentials no longer secured an automatic advantage for the Iraqi Islamic Party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These changes coincided with internal divisions and legal proceedings against prominent individuals. Tariq al-Hashimi left the Iraqi Islamic Party in 2009; a warrant was issued for his arrest in 2011 and death sentences in absentia followed in 2012 under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Al-Hashimi denied the allegations and described the proceedings as politically motivated [36]. Although those proceedings occurred after his departure from the party, they concerned a central figure in its rise and intensified perceptions of vulnerability within the wider political milieu.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">6.3 The 2012\u20132013 Protests: From Accumulated Grievances to the Clearing of Sit-ins<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The 2012\u20132013 protests followed years of tension between the government and sections of the population in predominantly Sunni governorates. Grievances included alleged arbitrary detention, the application of counterterrorism legislation, perceived discrimination, and inadequate political representation [37]. These complaints accumulated before becoming public demands shared by demonstrators in multiple cities and governorates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The protests began in late December 2012, developing into demonstrations and sit-ins that lasted approximately a year. Friday sermons and the participation of religious figures in organizing gatherings restored the mosque pulpit to a prominent role in mobilization, alongside tribal and political actors. The government made limited concessions, including releasing some detainees, but the central demands remained unresolved and public confidence was not restored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The crisis deepened with the use of force against demonstrators. Nine protesters were killed by army gunfire in Fallujah on 25 January 2013. Live fire was used against protesters in Mosul in March. On 23 April, security forces stormed the Hawija protest site, killing 44 civilians according to investigative findings cited in human rights reporting. Gatherings of worshippers were also attacked: on 17 May, the bombing of Sariya Mosque in Baqubah killed 40 people and wounded 46 according to contemporary reports. The mosque had hosted united Friday prayers associated with the protest movement. Although responsibility for these events differed, their cumulative effect was to intensify perceptions of grievance and insecurity among sections of Sunni society and to erode confidence in negotiation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The year ended with the forcible dismantling of the Ramadi sit-in on 30 December 2013. Associated clashes left 17 people dead, according to Human Rights Watch. In a subsequent episode of sectarian violence, the Musab ibn Umayr Mosque massacre took place in Diyala on 22 August 2014. Human Rights Watch documented the deaths of 34 civilians and reported witness accounts attributing the attack to pro-government militia gunmen and elements of the local police. The incident belongs to the broader deterioration of security and public trust, but is chronologically distinct from the sit-in period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The period exposed divisions within Sunni religious circles. Preachers and leaders of organized Islamist movements helped mobilize protesters, while other scholars opposed the demonstrations or warned against them. Disagreements concerned the legitimacy of sit-ins, obedience to state authority, negotiation, and the use of force, and had direct political consequences. The protest sites never constituted a single Brotherhood, Salafi, or Sufi organization: they brought together religious, tribal, and political actors whose choices diverged as violence escalated and opportunities for compromise narrowed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">7. The Sunni Religious Sphere Under ISIS and After Liberation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">7.1 The Coercive Monopolization of Religious Authority<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">ISIS&#8217;s seizure of parts of Iraq in 2014 fundamentally changed the conditions of religious activity. Competition no longer took place in an environment allowing multiple scholars and institutions to operate. The organization subordinated religious education and preaching to its authority, killed or forcibly disappeared Sunni and other opponents, and destroyed religious and Sufi sites [38]. It also instrumentalized <em>takfir<\/em> to strip adversaries of legitimacy and justify violence against them [39].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">ISIS rule should not be interpreted as the ascendancy of Salafism as a whole. The organization targeted Salafis who rejected its allegiance demands or practice of excommunication, as well as Sufi orders, traditional institutions, members of organized Islamist movements, and tribal communities. United Nations reports document the destruction of Sunni mosques and shrines in Mosul, including sites associated with local traditions and religious institutions [40]. The suppression of religious plurality was thus integral to ISIS&#8217;s project within the very society it claimed to represent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">7.2 The Disruption of Religious Networks<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Organizations and religious figures were forced to flee or scale back their activities. Others fought ISIS or supported local residents and security institutions. Religious motivations intersected with the defense of family, locality, and livelihood; the decisions of an entire city or tribe cannot therefore be attributed to a single ideological school. The organization&#8217;s crimes against Sunni tribes [41] demonstrate that the conflict was not simply a confrontation between the state and a unified Sunni society. It also involved an assault on local actors who refused ISIS rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For Sufi institutions, the war threatened shrines, lodges, and modes of religious education. Anti-<em>takfir<\/em> Salafi currents sought to underscore their differences from ISIS. Activist Islamist organizations confronted the collapse of their local bases and the dispersal of their communities, though some educational and social programs continued beyond ISIS-controlled territory. The war did not confer on any one group the exclusive right to represent the organization&#8217;s victims or opponents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">7.3 Liberation and the Reconstitution of Religious Life<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">ISIS&#8217;s period of extensive territorial control ended with Iraq&#8217;s declaration of military victory on 9 December 2017. The war had displaced approximately six million Iraqis since 2014, according to the International Organization for Migration [42]. Following liberation, the resumption of religious activity depended on the return of displaced residents, reconstruction of mosques, and reopening of educational institutions, as well as security and administrative vetting procedures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Local balances of influence changed as ISIS killed some religious figures and displaced others. Some individuals prominent in pre-ISIS demonstrations also became subject to security vetting. Meanwhile, new religious actors emerged, some enjoying political backing. Unequal opportunities to return and operate affected the capacity of different groups to regain pulpits and access state institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The mobilizing capacity of certain activist religious groups and figures consequently declined from the levels they had reached during the sit-ins, when they had opposed policies they regarded as sectarian or arbitrary. Displacement, losses suffered by their constituencies, and restrictions on public space weakened their ability to recover earlier roles. The degree of decline varied by locality, and their social presence endured to different extents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Conversely, groups that had been less visible in protest mobilization acquired greater prominence. These included Madkhali-oriented Salafi circles, which had opposed demonstrations and stressed obedience to the ruler and the avoidance of confrontation. Among Sufi organizations, the Muhammadan Ribat expanded its presence after publicly supporting the Popular Mobilization Forces during the liberation campaigns. The demand for security and the reduced operational capacity of rivals created more favorable conditions for such groups. Acceptance by state institutions and relationships with influential actors became increasingly important in regaining access to mosque pulpits. These shifts demonstrate changes in opportunities for activity and public presence; measuring the actual growth of any group&#8217;s social constituency still requires independent local evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The war thus reordered relations among religious figures, their communities, and the state. Discourses emphasizing stability gained salience, alongside local actors&#8217; ability to help residents recover rights and obtain services. At the same time, the contraction of protest reflected, in part, the rising costs and shrinking avenues of dissent, while grievances persisted to varying degrees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">8. The Redistribution of Influence After ISIS: The Contemporary Landscape<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">8.1 The Decline of Traditional Parties and the Rise of Local Alliances<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Following ISIS&#8217;s defeat, a growing share of Sunni political competition shifted toward local leaders and alliances that emphasized services, reconstruction, and access to state institutions as means of building support. Religious milieus sometimes retained their organizational structures or preaching platforms but no longer automatically commanded the principal vehicles of political representation [43, 44]. This helps explain why parties without an explicitly religious identity seek the endorsement of scholars, while religious groups need intermediaries who can protect their activities and facilitate institutional access.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For some activist Islamist constituencies, the legacy of religious outreach, sacrifice, and organizational ties continued to sustain identification despite weak electoral results. Organizational survival, however, is not the same as political leadership. An organization may maintain education, internal structures, and social services even as electoral support shifts to alliances in which prominent individuals and local resources matter more than the movement&#8217;s name.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">8.2 The Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq: The Persistence of Activist Networks<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Brotherhood tradition and its historical offshoots remain present through organizations most notably including the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Justice and Benevolence Movement. Shared origins must be distinguished from present-day formal affiliation. The Islamic Party retains political and organizational activity despite a marked decline in its relative weight, while the Justice and Benevolence Movement continues to operate through its leadership, offices, and member-training programs [45, 46, 47], albeit with limited political and popular reach.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The endurance of both structures reflects the persistence of organized Islamist traditions, notwithstanding their reduced capacity to lead a broadly representative Sunni political front. Their relationships and alliances [48] should be assessed according to each organization&#8217;s documented decisions and actual participation, distinguishing organizational affiliation from the presence of individuals with similar backgrounds on wider electoral lists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">8.3 The Kasnazani Order and Explicit Electoral Alliances<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nehru Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Kasnazani, also known as Shams al-Din and head of the Aliyya Qadiriyya Kasnazaniyya Sufi order, announced his withdrawal from the Taqaddum Alliance on 11 December 2022 [49]. On 17 December, the Unified Anbar Alliance announced that the Iraqi Unity Gathering had joined it following al-Kasnazani&#8217;s direction, which included an appeal to members of the order to support the alliance [50].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The case reveals the intersection of Sufi leadership, family networks, a political organization, and a local alliance, with scope to reconsider partners when calculations of representation change. Yet a leadership directive does not establish how many followers complied, and a new alliance does not imply that all disciples transferred their support. Their relationships with the order intersect with family considerations, services, and individual political preferences. A leadership&#8217;s influence must therefore be evaluated through both its capacity to act and its representative reach, rather than reducing the Sufi community to an electoral list&#8217;s results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">8.4 The Muhammadan Ribat and Institutional Representation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Muhammadan Ribat operates through a body that identifies its president and representatives and documents recurring activities. In Diyala, Ahmad Abbas al-Bayati appeared as a council representative at a Qur&#8217;anic event in 2023 [51]. In Nineveh, the council named Rami al-Abbadi in connection with a Mosul event in 2025 [52]. In October 2026, Muhammad al-Kahli was identified as its Anbar representative and imam of Fallujah&#8217;s Grand Mosque [53]. These examples show the intersection of education, the pulpit, and local institutional representation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Its political and security channels extend through meetings involving Abd al-Qadir al-Alusi. Among them was his reception of Popular Mobilization Commission chairman Falih al-Fayyad in Haditha in July 2024 [54], as well as contact with leaders of the al-Jughayfa tribe [55]. The council has also published accounts of meetings with a delegation from Asa&#8217;ib Ahl al-Haq [56] and the Islamic Supreme Council [57]. Its activities have included representatives of the Popular Mobilization Forces&#8217; ideological guidance apparatus. Taken together, these publicly reported contacts establish relationships beyond religious preaching.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reports on the al-Alusi school in Fallujah published in early November 2026 further demonstrate the educational dimension of this presence [58]. The council&#8217;s potential strength lies in combining religious training, local representation, and institutional relationships. These assets, however, neither grant it a monopoly over Sufism nor establish that it administers all mosques in its areas of activity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">8.5 The Sunni Endowment Office and Competition for the Pulpit<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Mosque administration and appointments became major arenas of post-liberation competition because they determine who may preach and teach, who receives employment, and who enjoys official recognition. This field is regulated by Law No. 56 of 2012 concerning the Sunni Endowment Office [59]. Article 10 assigns the Scientific Council a recommendatory role in matters concerning religious personnel, with the head of the Office approving its decisions and recommendations [60]. This institutional structure helps explain the value of proximity to the Office, while ownership of a building, administration of an endowment, and appointment of an imam remain legally distinct matters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In a number of governorates and cities, competition emerged among Salafi and Sufi figures and organizations, including the Muhammadan Ribat, over mosque administration, appointments of preachers, and the recovery of pulpits after liberation. The forms of competition varied by local context, with political and administrative relationships influencing opportunities to operate. Fallujah offers one example: rivalry intensified as residents returned after 2016 and Salafi preaching platforms expanded in 2018 and 2019 [61].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Such disputes combine doctrinal disagreements with competition over institutional resources. Celebrations of the Prophet&#8217;s birthday (<em>mawlid<\/em>), collective remembrance (<em>dhikr<\/em>), and intercession or seeking mediation (<em>tawassul<\/em>) distinguish religious orientations. But their political implications become concrete when doctrinal assessments influence the appointment or exclusion of an imam. One actor may secure an administrative decision without winning over all worshippers; another may retain followers despite losing a pulpit. Social and administrative influence can thus diverge significantly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">8.6 Conflict Inside the Mosque and Its Wider Repercussions<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The death of Sheikh Abd al-Sattar al-Qarghuli, preacher at Karim al-Nasir Mosque in the Dora district of southern Baghdad, in September 2025 exposed the risks of a mosque dispute escalating into physical confrontation and religious and social controversy. Initial accounts differed over the assault and cause of death [62]. Reporting in December later indicated that four people had received death sentences and that appeals were being sought [63]. These reports concern the judgments, not their execution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The case developed into a wider cycle of defenses, allegations, tribal appeals, and calls for state intervention, illustrating how a local incident can mobilize constituencies beyond those immediately involved. Criminal responsibility attaches to individuals and what the judiciary establishes. The political question concerns how such incidents are used in claims to representation, mediation, and the exclusion of rivals. A defendant&#8217;s or convicted person&#8217;s religious identity must not be treated as collective culpability for an entire current.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">9. Madkhali Salafism and Political Participation Outside Party Structures<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">9.1 Origins and the Distinction Between Obedience and Party Affiliation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Iraqi Madkhalism did not originate through the establishment of a political party or a unified founding congress. Rather, it developed through engagement with Salafi authorities beyond Iraq and local disagreements about organization, resistance, and political authority [64]. Rabi&#8217; al-Madkhali became prominent in the Saudi context through disputes with activist currents and the Islamic Awakening discourse. These competing scholarly influences subsequently reached Iraqi settings and were adapted to different local conditions. The Iraqi current is therefore better understood as an accumulation of teaching relationships, contacts, and positions than as a complete administrative replication of a foreign organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Its rejection of party factionalism rests on the argument that loyalty to an organization and its leaders may compete with religious allegiance and the unity of the Muslim community, while public challenges to authority risk <em>fitna<\/em>\u2014discord\u2014and confrontation. Yet rejection of party organization does not eliminate social organization. Teaching circles, scholarly commendations, mutual recognition, and joint activities generate durable networks and influence even in the absence of membership cards or an announced party leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">9.2 Religious Justifications in Madkhali Thought<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The discourse of obedience draws on religious texts including the Qur&#8217;anic injunction to obey God, the Prophet, and those vested with authority, as well as hadith on hearing and obeying rulers. It is qualified by the obligation to obey only in what is right and by the prohibition on obedience in sin [65, 66]. The controversy concerns how these conditions are interpreted and applied to actual rulers and forms of dissent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Iraq, obedience does not necessarily entail allegiance to a particular religious leader or party. In September 2025, Ubayd al-Shammari, imam and preacher of the Grand Ghazaliya Mosque in Baghdad, stated that Iraq&#8217;s three branches of government constituted the authority to which obedience was owed. He described elections as a religious necessity while rejecting the Madkhali label [67]. His position illustrates how obedience may be assigned to existing state institutions rather than made contingent on doctrinal agreement with the governing party.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This framework allows a distinction between rejecting the creation of political parties and permitting a vote for a candidate regarded as more suitable or less harmful, or contact with officials to protect the public interest or safeguard religious work. Such rationales vary among scholars and authorities. One scholar&#8217;s opinion should not be attributed to all Salafis or everyone described as Madkhali. Nor does endorsement of elections imply a theoretical acceptance of every principle of democracy or of party alliances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A separate issue concerns Muslims accepting public employment under a non-Muslim occupying power, the question addressed by Abu Manar al-Alami [68]. Accepting administrative work to prevent institutions from being wholly ceded to the occupier differs conceptually from treating Iraq&#8217;s elected institutions as authorities owed obedience. Similar preferences for working within institutions do not, by themselves, justify classifying both positions as Madkhali.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">9.3 How Religious Education Becomes Organized Political Action<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regular teaching develops a constituency familiar with an instructor and confident in his sources. Scholarly endorsements and warnings then give religious figures influence over whom their students consider authoritative or unacceptable. When attitudes toward elections or protest become part of the definition of the \u201ccorrect methodology,\u201d political guidance acquires religious weight beyond an individual&#8217;s preference. Its effectiveness nonetheless depends on scholarly standing, direct relationships, and a sustained local presence. It may weaken when religious authorities disagree or when their preferred political choice conflicts with family or local interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Kinship and tribal networks facilitate meetings, donations, and mediation, but do not automatically transmit a political position to every member of a tribe. Organizational capacity becomes more visible when the same individuals repeatedly appear as representatives in particular issues. Shared doctrinal commitments remain wider than any local leadership&#8217;s actual reach. This explains how coordinated or similar action can occur rapidly without a centralized party apparatus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">9.4 Evidence of Participation: From Endorsement to Negotiation<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Political participation is apparent at two complementary levels: public positions on the legitimacy of elections and state authority, and the mobilization of endorsements or negotiation over conditions for religious work. A video published on former MP Talal al-Zobaie&#8217;s page documents a gathering in the Abu Munaysir area of Abu Ghraib, west of Baghdad, organized by Sheikh Haytham Abd Allah Abu Abd al-Rahman, at which support for al-Zobaie was announced [69]. Reporting from Fallujah also attributed to interviewees a role for al-Zobaie and the Taqaddum Party in facilitating Salafi activity in earlier periods. These examples establish endorsement and local relationships, not the doctrinal identity of every participant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Public posts also documented congratulations and receptions involving religious figures after parliament approved Nayif Mukayf al-Shammari as minister of defense on 15 October 2026 and he assumed office on 17 October [70]. One such post on Muhammad Shihab al-Juburi&#8217;s page thanked the minister for receiving him [71].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A more clearly collective intervention appeared during the 2025 controversy. A report described a security directive dated 27 April that characterized Madkhalism as a threat [72]. On 21 May, Saad al-Nayif, imam and preacher of al-Mustafa Mosque in Khan Dhari, Abu Ghraib, rejected the designation and security characterization and reiterated his opposition to rebellion against the authorities [73]. The following day, a statement from the National Security Advisory documented a meeting between then National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji, al-Nayif, and notables from Anbar and Salah al-Din to discuss civil peace and cooperation with state institutions [74].<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Lorem Ipsum has been the industry&#8217;s standard dummy text ever since the 1500s.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In June, an image circulated of an official letter dated 12 June concerning review of the designation and verification of whether the activities in question met the criteria for violent extremism threatening public peace and security [75]. The sequence demonstrates that religious figures and local notables were able to move the issue into formal dialogue. It does not prove that the meeting caused every later administrative measure, nor does an administrative review constitute a general judicial finding exonerating or criminalizing an entire current.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">9.5 Why This Current Became More Visible After ISIS<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The study explains the current&#8217;s increased visibility through the convergence of established educational networks, social demand for security, and politicians&#8217; interest in religious constituencies that do not compete through an independent Islamist party. Non-party endorsement enables a scholar to maintain religious outreach while a politician benefits from recurrent local recognition. Mediation over mosque affairs can in turn sustain the relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This does not establish uniform or quantitatively verified expansion. Some of the increased public visibility resulted from controversy over security classification and the public responses it elicited. The more robust finding is that particular figures demonstrably moved from teaching into representation, negotiation, and endorsement, while the size of their constituencies and the extent of electoral compliance remain variable. The analytical paradox is therefore participation in the distribution of political influence while rejecting party organization\u2014not a sudden entry into politics from a previously apolitical condition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">10. Geography, Resources, and the Limits of Influence<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">10.1 Baghdad and Anbar<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Abu Ghraib and Baghdad&#8217;s surrounding belt contain Salafi and Madkhali-associated networks connecting mosques, scholars, kinship, and political intermediaries. The case of al-Mustafa Mosque in Khan Dhari allows these relationships to be traced through an identifiable figure and documented event, without assigning a single religious identity to the entire Baghdad belt. Baghdad itself accommodates varied Salafi, Sufi, and activist religious traditions. Figures and circles from the Brotherhood tradition remain active through mosques, education, and community work beyond their electoral and party-political presence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Anbar, the religious landscape differs among Fallujah, Haditha, Ramadi, and their rural hinterlands according to the presence of religious schools, preaching platforms, Sufi lodges, and tribal relationships. Brotherhood-oriented and activist Islamist circles retain religious and social connections despite the decline of their political vehicles. This takes place in a political setting in which Muhammad al-Halbousi&#8217;s Taqaddum Party exercises considerable influence. Al-Halbousi has repeatedly criticized the Muslim Brotherhood and declared his opposition to its return to the administration of the governorate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Conversely, published testimonies point to support from Taqaddum and political figures for certain Salafi scholars and preaching platforms, including Madkhali-associated circles, and to opportunities for greater activity in earlier phases. This illustrates the overlap between party competition and the redistribution of religious opportunities and institutional access, varying according to city, actor, and period. It does not reduce social influence to electoral strength or establish a permanent alliance between Taqaddum and the Salafis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">10.2 Salah al-Din, Nineveh, and Diyala<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Salah al-Din is among Iraq&#8217;s historically established Salafi milieus. Since 2003 it has witnessed conflicting positions on resistance, state employment, and elections, alongside Brotherhood-oriented and Sufi organizations and networks linked to the former state. Abu Manar al-Alami&#8217;s rejection of combat and encouragement of work within state institutions provides one example despite the broader local climate of opposition to the occupation. The governorate also contained resistance factions and supportive communities. This plurality reflects differences among groups and religious authorities; proving a change of position within one particular group requires following its statements over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Mosul and the wider Nineveh governorate retain diverse jurisprudential, Sufi, Salafi, and activist Islamist traditions, with differences between the city, its countryside, the Jazira region, Rabi&#8217;a, and western areas. The Brotherhood tradition remains socially present through religious and educational figures and community ties, alongside the activities of the Muhammadan Ribat [76] and other groups. Displacement, returns, and mosque reconstruction reshaped this field after ISIS.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Diyala, sectarian diversity intersects with tribal relationships and the location of state institutions. Salafi, Sufi, and Brotherhood-oriented circles coexist but experience unequal opportunities depending on locality and security conditions. The Ribat&#8217;s published activities establish that it has local representation, without making it or any other group representative of the whole governorate. Two mosques within the same city may answer to different religious authorities and maintain different political alliances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Across these governorates, a decline in the Brotherhood tradition&#8217;s formal political representation must be distinguished from the persistence of its religious and social presence. A party&#8217;s or movement&#8217;s electoral position cannot be taken as a complete measure of its broader educational, religious, or local networks. Equally, identification with that milieu does not necessarily imply organizational membership or adherence to one political position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">10.3 Resources and External Relationships<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The resources supporting religious activity include education, donations, endowed property, paid religious positions, volunteer labor, and relationships with community notables. Each resource carries different conditions and implications for decision-making. Accumulated educational and community ties enable some Brotherhood-oriented circles to persist despite reduced party influence. Other currents depend to varying degrees on Sufi lodges, scholarly authorities, or mosque administration. Legally paid religious salaries are not necessarily party financing, just as charitable contributions do not prove complete financial independence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Salafi currents draw on scholars, books, and religious opinions originating beyond Iraq, while Sufi and Brotherhood-oriented organizations also maintain external religious, intellectual, and institutional connections. Such links do not automatically establish government direction or political funding. Iraqi circumstances remain decisive in shaping actual conduct: local acceptance, endowment administration, party plurality, and competing centers of authority. Thus similar ideological affiliations can produce different outcomes according to locality, political partners, and an organization&#8217;s position within institutions and society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">11. Conclusion and Findings<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Political participation within Iraq&#8217;s Sunni religious sphere has followed multiple trajectories since 2003. Organizations and individuals within the same religious tradition have pursued different options: service within state institutions, armed resistance, protest, and political alliances. Religious understandings shaped which means each actor regarded as legitimate, while security conditions, local interests, and relationships with state institutions influenced which options were feasible and sustainable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The decline of party-political representation has proceeded at a different pace from changes in religious and social presence. The Iraqi Islamic Party and activist Islamist currents have lost much of their previous capacity to lead Sunni political representation, even as their educational, outreach, and organizational work has continued. Sufi groups have maintained social ties, some while entering public alliances. Their social reach must be assessed with evidence independent of electoral outcomes; evaluating the effects of their political endorsements likewise requires evidence of how far their followers actually respond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The war against ISIS and the post-liberation period redistributed opportunities for religious activity. Population returns, mosque reconstruction, appointments, and security and administrative vetting affected actors&#8217; ability to recover preaching platforms. Social exhaustion and the increased costs of confrontation plausibly enhanced the appeal of stability-oriented discourse, while institutional and local political relationships helped some actors resume their work. The cases examined show uneven opportunities for activity and visibility, but measuring changes in the size of their constituencies requires independent local evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Madkhali case demonstrates how opposition to party factionalism delineates the forms of political engagement accepted by particular associated figures. They distinguished party membership from communication with state institutions or endorsement of candidates. Some justified these practices by invoking obedience in what is right, assessments of public interest, and the avoidance of confrontation. The authority that scholars accumulate through teaching and preaching, together with their relationships with local notables, helps explain their capacity for mediation and their ability to lend local significance to an electoral endorsement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Such participation takes distinct forms. In the 2025 security controversy, the meeting involving Sheikh Saad al-Nayif, community notables, and the National Security Adviser moved the dispute into formal dialogue [77]. In Abu Ghraib, support for Talal al-Zobaie was announced publicly at a local gathering [78]. Both cases show how local networks can be mobilized either to engage the state on a security issue or to express an electoral preference. The evidence remains specific to the actors concerned; claims of unified leadership or broad electoral compliance require additional corroboration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ultimately, an actor&#8217;s influence depends on its ability to sustain activity, maintain community relationships, access institutions, and achieve verifiable outcomes. An official meeting establishes access; a public endorsement establishes a stated position. Neither alone establishes the meeting&#8217;s effect on state decisions or the endorsement&#8217;s effect on voting behavior. Preserving these analytical distinctions clarifies the nature of competition within the Sunni religious sphere and the varying capacities of its actors to convert local presence into political influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h4 class=\"wp-block-heading\">12. Sources and References<\/h4>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[1]<\/strong> Muhannad Salloum, \u201cAn Unhappy Return: What the Iraqi Islamic Party Gave Up to Gain Power,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (10 December 2018). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/ar\/middle-east\/research\/2018\/12\/an-unhappy-return-what-the-iraqi-islamic-party-gave-up-to-gain-power\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[2]<\/strong> Jareda, statements by Ubayd al-Shammari, \u201cThere Is No Madkhalism in Iraq; Some Seek to Associate It with Salafism\u201d (16 September 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/jaredaiq.net\/News\/18801\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[3]<\/strong> 964 Network, reporting a National Security Advisory statement, \u201cAl-Araji Meets Sheikh Saad al-Nayif\u201d (22 May 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/554436\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[4]<\/strong> Talal Khudayr al-Zobaie, Facebook video of an Abu Ghraib gathering organized by Sheikh Haytham Abd Allah Abu Abd al-Rahman in Abu Munaysir, announcing support for al-Zobaie (available as of 27 October 2026) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/talal.alzobaie\/videos\/1346174907065414\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[5]<\/strong> Al Jazeera, \u201cThe Iraqi Islamic Party,\u201d encyclopedic profile (9 February 2014) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/encyclopedia\/2014\/2\/9\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[6]<\/strong> Yahya al-Kubaisi, \u201cSalafism in Iraq: Domestic Changes and External Pulls,\u201d Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (6 May 2013) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/studies.aljazeera.net\/en\/node\/3549\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[7]<\/strong> Samuel Helfont, Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq (Oxford University Press, 2018), published academic book abstract. <a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/book\/6710\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[8]<\/strong> Samuel Helfont, \u201cIraq\u2019s Religious Landscape in the Wake of the Gulf War,\u201d in Compulsion in Religion (2018), chap. 7, 114\u2013128, available abstract. <a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/book\/6710\/chapter-abstract\/150776466\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[9]<\/strong> Samuel Helfont, \u201cA Transformed Religious Landscape,\u201d in Compulsion in Religion (2018), chap. 8, 131\u2013144, available abstract. <a href=\"https:\/\/academic.oup.com\/book\/6710\/chapter-abstract\/150777091\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[10]<\/strong> David Jordan, \u201cState and Religion in Iraq: The Sufi Insurgency of the Former Ba\u02bfth Regime in Historical Context,\u201d International Journal of Middle East Studies 55, no. 2 (2023): 344\u2013352. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S0020743823000818\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[11]<\/strong> Quintan Wiktorowicz, \u201cAnatomy of the Salafi Movement,\u201d Studies in Conflict &amp; Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): 207\u2013239. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/10576100500497004\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[12]<\/strong> International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report no. 50 (15 February 2006), hosted by Refworld. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.refworld.org\/reference\/countryrep\/icg\/2006\/38047\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[13]<\/strong> Mohammad Abu Rumman, \u201cThe Politics of Sunni Armed Groups in Iraq,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (18 August 2008). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/sada\/2008\/08\/the-politics-of-sunni-armed-groups-in-iraq\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[14]<\/strong> 964 Network, \u201cBaghdad Salafis Respond to the Government: We Forbid Even Opposition, and We Are Not Madkhalis\u201d (21 May 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/554018\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[15]<\/strong> Jamileh Kadivar, \u201cExploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The Case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh\u2019s Media,\u201d Contemporary Review of the Middle East 7, no. 3 (2020): 259\u2013285. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/2347798920921706\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[16]<\/strong> 964 Network, interview with Abu Manar al-Alami on institutional work after the occupation and his rejection of the Madkhali label (24 May 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/555328\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[17]<\/strong> Al-Araby al-Jadeed, \u201cJustice and Benevolence: The Official Wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq,\u201d including remarks by Rashid al-Azzawi and Faisal al-Issawi (27 February 2024) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.alaraby.co.uk\/politics\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%AD-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[18]<\/strong> Alsumaria News, \u201cThe Iraqi Unity Gathering Joins the Unified Anbar Alliance,\u201d reporting the alliance\u2019s announcement and al-Kasnazani\u2019s instruction (17 December 2022) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.alsumaria.tv\/news\/politics\/441492\/alsumaria-articles\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[19]<\/strong> Shafaq News, \u201cSalafi-Sufi Rivalry over Mosques Stirs Tensions in Iraq\u2019s Fallujah\u201d (22 October 2026). <a href=\"https:\/\/shafaq.com\/en\/society\/Salafi-Sufi-rivalry-over-mosques-stirs-tensions-in-Iraq-s-Fallujah\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[20]<\/strong> Harith Hasan al-Qarawee, \u201cIraq\u2019s Sectarian Crisis: A Legacy of Exclusion,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (23 April 2014). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/middle-east\/research\/2014\/04\/iraqs-sectarian-crisis-a-legacy-of-exclusion\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[21]<\/strong> Harith Hasan, \u201cReligious Authority and the Politics of Islamic Endowments in Iraq,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (29 March 2019). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2019\/06\/religious-authority-and-the-politics-of-islamic-endowments-in-iraq\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[22]<\/strong> Harith Hasan, \u201cReligious Authority and the Politics of Islamic Endowments in Iraq,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (29 March 2019). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2019\/06\/religious-authority-and-the-politics-of-islamic-endowments-in-iraq\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[23]<\/strong> Yahya al-Kubaisi, \u201cSalafism in Iraq: Domestic Changes and External Pulls,\u201d Al Jazeera Centre for Studies (6 May 2013) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/studies.aljazeera.net\/en\/node\/3549\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[24]<\/strong> International Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, Middle East Report no. 50 (15 February 2006), hosted by Refworld. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.refworld.org\/reference\/countryrep\/icg\/2006\/38047\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[25]<\/strong> Michael Knights, \u201cThe JRTN Movement and Iraq\u2019s Next Insurgency,\u201d CTC Sentinel 4, no. 7 (July 2011). <a href=\"https:\/\/ctc.westpoint.edu\/?p=8452\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[26]<\/strong> Mohammad Abu Rumman, \u201cThe Politics of Sunni Armed Groups in Iraq,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (18 August 2008). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/sada\/2008\/08\/the-politics-of-sunni-armed-groups-in-iraq\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[27]<\/strong> Al Jazeera, \u201cThe Iraqi Islamic Party,\u201d encyclopedic profile (9 February 2014) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/encyclopedia\/2014\/2\/9\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[28]<\/strong> Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security, Report RL31339 (22 February 2007), EveryCRSReport archive. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.everycrsreport.com\/files\/20070222_RL31339_ec5e077237fa8d4e6032d2bbc17919843f43adfe.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[29]<\/strong> Al Jazeera, \u201cThe Iraqi Islamic Party,\u201d encyclopedic profile (9 February 2014) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/encyclopedia\/2014\/2\/9\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[30]<\/strong> Al Jazeera, \u201cUS Forces Release Leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party\u201d (30 May 2005) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/news\/2005\/5\/30\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%B1%D8%AC-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%B2%D8%B9%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[31]<\/strong> Agence France-Presse, republished by Al-Anbaa, report on the assassination of the Iraqi vice president\u2019s brother, with background on Maysun and Mahmud al-Hashimi (10 October 2006) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.alanba.com.kw\/ar\/arabic-international-news\/2676\/10-10-2006-%D8%A7%D8%BA%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B4%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[32]<\/strong> David Jordan, \u201cState and Religion in Iraq: The Sufi Insurgency of the Former Ba\u02bfth Regime in Historical Context,\u201d International Journal of Middle East Studies 55, no. 2 (2023): 344\u2013352. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1017\/S0020743823000818\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[33]<\/strong> Harith Hasan, \u201cReligious Authority and the Politics of Islamic Endowments in Iraq,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (29 March 2019). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2019\/06\/religious-authority-and-the-politics-of-islamic-endowments-in-iraq\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[34]<\/strong> Harith Hasan al-Qarawee, \u201cIraq\u2019s Sectarian Crisis: A Legacy of Exclusion,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (23 April 2014). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/middle-east\/research\/2014\/04\/iraqs-sectarian-crisis-a-legacy-of-exclusion\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[35]<\/strong> Harith Hasan al-Qarawee, \u201cIraq\u2019s Sectarian Crisis: A Legacy of Exclusion,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (23 April 2014). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/middle-east\/research\/2014\/04\/iraqs-sectarian-crisis-a-legacy-of-exclusion\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[36]<\/strong> Al Jazeera, \u201cTariq al-Hashimi,\u201d biographical profile (10 December 2014) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.net\/encyclopedia\/2014\/12\/10\/%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%87%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%85%D9%8A\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[37]<\/strong> International Crisis Group, Make or Break: Iraq\u2019s Sunnis and the State, Middle East Report no. 144 (14 August 2013), Refworld archive. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.refworld.org\/reference\/countryrep\/icg\/2013\/97796\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[38]<\/strong> UNAMI and OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq, 6 July\u201310 September 2014. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/Documents\/Countries\/IQ\/UNAMI_OHCHR_POC_Report_FINAL_6July_10September2014.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[39]<\/strong> Jamileh Kadivar, \u201cExploring Takfir, Its Origins and Contemporary Use: The Case of Takfiri Approach in Daesh\u2019s Media,\u201d Contemporary Review of the Middle East 7, no. 3 (2020): 259\u2013285. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/2347798920921706\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[40]<\/strong> UNAMI and OHCHR, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq, 11 December 2014\u201330 April 2015. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/Documents\/Countries\/IQ\/UNAMI_OHCHR_4th_POCReport-11Dec2014-30April2015.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[41]<\/strong> UNITAD, Twelfth Report to the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S\/2024\/408 (24 May 2024), paras. 36\u201337. <a href=\"https:\/\/iraq.un.org\/en\/download\/162082\/270711\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[42]<\/strong> International Organization for Migration, Iraq Displacement Crises 2014\u20132017 (28 March 2019). <a href=\"https:\/\/iraq.un.org\/en\/171761-iraq-displacement-crises-2014-2017\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[43]<\/strong> Muhannad Salloum, \u201cAn Unhappy Return: What the Iraqi Islamic Party Gave Up to Gain Power,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (10 December 2018). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/ar\/middle-east\/research\/2018\/12\/an-unhappy-return-what-the-iraqi-islamic-party-gave-up-to-gain-power\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[44]<\/strong> Renad Mansour, \u201cThe Sunni Predicament in Iraq,\u201d Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (3 March 2016). <a href=\"https:\/\/carnegieendowment.org\/research\/2016\/03\/the-sunni-predicament-in-iraq\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[45]<\/strong> Justice and Benevolence Movement, leadership review of work-plan implementation in the Rusafa administrative office (24 June 2026) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/awi-iq.com\/%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%B0\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[46]<\/strong> Justice and Benevolence Movement, announcement on a new-membership event (23 October 2026); reported attendance of approximately 250 is the organizer\u2019s figure [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/awi-iq.com\/%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%85%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[47]<\/strong> Justice and Benevolence Movement, report on the outreach office\u2019s visit to the Kurdistan administrative office (31 October 2026) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/awi-iq.com\/%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D9%83%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%AF%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%88\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[48]<\/strong> Justice and Benevolence Movement, report on a meeting with the secretary-general of the Islamic Dawa Party\u2013Iraq Organization (19 January 2023) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/awi-iq.com\/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%85-%D9%8A%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D9%84-%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[49]<\/strong> Shafaq News, report on a Sufi order joining the Unified Anbar Alliance after withdrawing from al-Halbousi\u2019s alliance (17 December 2022) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/shafaq.com\/ar\/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9\/%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B6%D9%85-%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%AF\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[50]<\/strong> Alsumaria News, \u201cThe Iraqi Unity Gathering Joins the Unified Anbar Alliance,\u201d reporting the alliance\u2019s announcement and al-Kasnazani\u2019s instruction (17 December 2022) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.alsumaria.tv\/news\/politics\/441492\/alsumaria-articles\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[51]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, report on participation in a Qur\u2019an memorization graduation ceremony in Diyala (13 September 2023) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=2020\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[52]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, report on a memorial gathering in Mosul and attendance by a PMF ideological guidance representative (19 August 2025) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=5605\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[53]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, participation in a Prophet\u2019s birthday celebration at the University of Fallujah, identifying Muhammad al-Kahli (17 October 2026) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=7191\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[54]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, meeting between Abd al-Qadir al-Alusi and PMF chairman Falih al-Fayyad in Haditha (meeting 30 July; report 1 August 2024) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=3874\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[55]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, meeting with al-Jughayfa tribal leaders in Haditha (visit 25 July; report 27 July 2024) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=3838\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[56]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, report on receiving a Sadiqun Movement delegation (11 August 2024) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=3936\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[57]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, report on a meeting between Abd al-Qadir al-Alusi and Humam Hamoudi (20 December 2025) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=5874\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[58]<\/strong> Muhammadan Ribat Council of Scholars, report on a graduation event at the al-Alusi school in Fallujah (1 November 2026) [Arabic; organizational source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/rabat-mohammedi.com\/?p=7277\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[59]<\/strong> Iraqi Ministry of Justice, Iraqi Gazette, issue no. 4254 (15 October 2012), announcement dated 23 October 2012 [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.moj.gov.iq\/view.150\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[60]<\/strong> Iraqi Laws Guide, republication of Law No. 56 of 2012 on the Iraqi Sunni Endowment Office, art. 10, especially clauses 2 and 4 [Arabic; reproduced legal text]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.iraqilaws.com\/2023\/10\/laws_01714399476.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[61]<\/strong> Shafaq News, \u201cSalafi-Sufi Rivalry over Mosques Stirs Tensions in Iraq\u2019s Fallujah\u201d (22 October 2026). <a href=\"https:\/\/shafaq.com\/en\/society\/Salafi-Sufi-rivalry-over-mosques-stirs-tensions-in-Iraq-s-Fallujah\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[62]<\/strong> Shafaq News, \u201cDeath of Baghdad Imam amid Mosque Dispute: What We Know So Far\u201d (13 September 2025). <a href=\"https:\/\/shafaq.com\/en\/Security\/Death-of-Baghdad-Imam-amid-mosque-dispute-WHAT-WE-KNOW-SO-FAR\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[63]<\/strong> 964 Network, report on four death sentences in the al-Qarghuli case and calls for appeal (30 December 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/638326\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[64]<\/strong> Quintan Wiktorowicz, \u201cAnatomy of the Salafi Movement,\u201d Studies in Conflict &amp; Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006): 207\u2013239. <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1080\/10576100500497004\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[65]<\/strong> Sahih al-Bukhari, Book of Judgments, hadith 7144, on obedience to an imam except in disobedience to God. <a href=\"https:\/\/sunnah.com\/bukhari:7144\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[66]<\/strong> Sahih Muslim, Book of Government, hadith 1709h, on obedience to rulers except in sin. <a href=\"https:\/\/sunnah.com\/muslim:1709h\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[67]<\/strong> Jareda, statements by Ubayd al-Shammari, \u201cThere Is No Madkhalism in Iraq; Some Seek to Associate It with Salafism\u201d (16 September 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/jaredaiq.net\/News\/18801\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[68]<\/strong> 964 Network, interview with Abu Manar al-Alami on institutional work after the occupation and his rejection of the Madkhali label (24 May 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/555328\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[69]<\/strong> Talal Khudayr al-Zobaie, Facebook video of an Abu Ghraib gathering organized by Sheikh Haytham Abd Allah Abu Abd al-Rahman in Abu Munaysir, announcing support for al-Zobaie (available as of 27 October 2026) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/talal.alzobaie\/videos\/1346174907065414\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[70]<\/strong> Iraqi Ministry of Defense, official Telegram channel, ministerial biography and announcement of Nayif al-Shammari taking office (October\u2013November 2026) [Arabic; official source]. <a href=\"https:\/\/t.me\/s\/Modiraq\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[71]<\/strong> Muhammad Shihab al-Juburi, Facebook video thanking Defense Minister Nayif al-Shammari for a reception (available as of 27 October 2026) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/mhmd.shhab.aljbwry\/videos\/1798239854651412\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[72]<\/strong> Gashtyar Akram, \u201cIraq Labels Salafi Branch High-Level Security Threat,\u201d The New Region (19 May 2025). <a href=\"https:\/\/thenewregion.com\/posts\/2314\/iraq-labels-salafi-branch-high-level-security-threat\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[73]<\/strong> 964 Network, \u201cBaghdad Salafis Respond to the Government: We Forbid Even Opposition, and We Are Not Madkhalis\u201d (21 May 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/554018\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[74]<\/strong> 964 Network, reporting a National Security Advisory statement, \u201cAl-Araji Meets Sheikh Saad al-Nayif\u201d (22 May 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/554436\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[75]<\/strong> Alssaa, image of National Security Advisory letter dated 12 June 2025 on reviewing the Madkhali designation; article published 29 June 2025 [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/alssaa.com\/post\/show\/35970-%D9%85%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D9%85%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AD%D8%B8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[76]<\/strong> International Organization for Migration, The Role of Religious Institutions in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Iraq (8 June 2023). <a href=\"https:\/\/iraq.un.org\/en\/235473-role-religious-institutions-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism-iraq-iom\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[77]<\/strong> 964 Network, reporting a National Security Advisory statement, \u201cAl-Araji Meets Sheikh Saad al-Nayif\u201d (22 May 2025) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/964media.com\/554436\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>[78]<\/strong> Talal Khudayr al-Zobaie, Facebook video of an Abu Ghraib gathering organized by Sheikh Haytham Abd Allah Abu Abd al-Rahman in Abu Munaysir, announcing support for al-Zobaie (available as of 27 October 2026) [Arabic]. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/talal.alzobaie\/videos\/1346174907065414\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Online source<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>1. Executive Summary The fall of Iraq&#8217;s political system in 2003 fundamentally reconfigured the relationship between Sunni religious life and politics. Organizations emerged from clandestine activity and exile; mosques assumed expanded roles in relief, guidance, and community protection; and multiple actors began claiming to speak for Sunni communities. These developments did not produce a unified &hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":2841,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"pagelayer_contact_templates":[],"_pagelayer_content":"","footnotes":"","_ppma_block_editor_authors":"{\"authors\":[194],\"author_categories\":{\"194\":\"1\"},\"fallback_author_user\":\"11\",\"ppma_author_box_select\":\"\",\"selected_authors\":[{\"id\":194,\"display_name\":\"Momen Alzrzoor\",\"is_guest\":1,\"category_id\":\"1\"}]}"},"categories":[32,25,40],"tags":[175,232,123,121,217,124,233,229,234,231,230],"ppma_author":[194],"class_list":["post-2905","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-research-studies","category-analytical-papers","category-40","tag-175","tag-brotherhood","tag-icfs","tag-iraq-2","tag-iraq-center-for-future-studies","tag-iraqcfs","tag-islamic","tag-religious","tag-salafism","tag-sufism","tag-sunni","author-momen-alzrzoor-1"],"views":23,"authors":[{"term_id":194,"user_id":0,"is_guest":1,"slug":"momen-alzrzoor-1","display_name":"Momen Alzrzoor","avatar_url":{"url":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/8A33FBD6-3655-48DA-8BD1-F1BD59172C0E.png","url2x":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/8A33FBD6-3655-48DA-8BD1-F1BD59172C0E.png"},"author_category":"1","first_name":"Momen","last_name":"Alzrzoor","user_url":"","job_title":"Data Journalist and Conflict Analyst","description":"<p>Momen Alzrzoor is an Iraqi data journalist and conflict analyst specializing in digital journalism, data analysis, and Iraqi affairs. He serves as Director of the Information and Data Department at the Iraq Center for Future Studies (ICFS), He holds a bachelor\u2019s degree in New Media from Istanbul Beykent University in Turkey and a degree in Public Relations from the College of Media at the University of Baghdad.<\/p>"}],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2905","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/11"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2905"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2905\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2926,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2905\/revisions\/2926"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2841"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2905"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2905"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2905"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/iraqcfs.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ppma_author?post=2905"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}